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One rainy November day, on a visit to Washington, D.C., I stum-
bled into the nearest refuge, which turned out to be the National
Building Museum. No doubt, this is one of the more obscure of the
Smithsonian museums and probably the least likely to be on anyone's
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. B.A.,J.D., University of Michi-
gan. An earlier version of this Article was delivered at the Law and Society Conference,
Miami Beach, Florida, May 26, 2000. I would like to thank Neil Buchanan for his thoughts,
Max Sawicky for early suggestions on approaching this issue, and research assistant Shawn
Arend.
My thoughts about privatization have been shaped by New Zealand during a time in
which it was engaged in fundamentally reshaping and privatizing its economy and society.
Since that time, I have written extensively about New Zealand labor law and, as part of that
work, have kept abreast of the progress of privatization there. This research and these
experiences have infused the way I look at the privatization debate in the United States. It
is therefore important that I acknowledge certain works. While they are not the source of
any specific points made in this Article, I could not have written it without having read
them and having absorbed their lessons. Among these would be papers of the New Zea-
land Business Roundtable, too numerous to list in their entirety here. Other works include
JONATHAN BOSTON ET AL., PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: THE NEW ZEALAND MODEL (Simon Cauchi
ed., 1996); PENELOPE BROOK, FREEDOM AT WORK (1990); IAN DUNCAN & ALAN BOLLARD,
CORPORATIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS FROM NEW ZEALAND (1992); PAUL HARRIS &
LINDA TWINAME, FIRST KNIGHTS: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ZEALAND BUSINESS ROUND-
TABLE (1998); TIM HAZLEDINE, TAKING NEW ZEALAND SERIOUSLY-. THE ECONOMICS OF DE-
CENCY (1998); BRUCE JESSON, ONLY THEIR PURPOSE IS MAD (1999);JANE KELSEY, ROLLING
BACK THE STATE: PRIVATISATION OF POWER IN AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND (1993); CONTROL-
LING INTERESTS: BUSINESS, THE STATE AND SOCIETY IN NEW ZEALAND (John Deeks & Nick
Perry eds., 1992); and THE STATE UNDER CONTRACT (Jonathan Boston ed., 1995).
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must-visit list. However, what you find inside is a magnificent hall with
soaring ceilings, floor and ceiling connected by enormous faux mar-
ble columns. On that first visit, the building was in the midst of reno-
vations after years of neglect. Yet even then, its dignity shone
through. What is now the National Building Museum was built to
house workers who processed payments to Civil War veterans, former
members of the Grand Army of the Republic. In other words, it was
built for public workers who were providing services for former public
workers.
So enervated is our opinion of public service today, it is a shock to
conceive of building this sort of edifice for mere government work-
ers-bean counters and paymasters at that. At one time, though, and
not so long ago, public buildings were important symbols of the might
and majesty of our government and, by close connection, of the peo-
ple. They embodied this country's image of itself as a shining city on a
hill. Government service was a calling, and a noble one. Drive
through Ohio's county seats, especially in the more rural areas, and
you will recapture the sort of buildings once conceived of as appropri-
ate for housing government.
Government buildings still symbolize how we view government.
Today's government buildings are unaesthetic, bland, even depressing
places, built on the cheap. They are demoralizing places to transact
the public's business. But, no doubt, if polled, most would agree that
they are good enough for government workers. Public workers and
government work are more likely to be the butt ofjokes today than to
be held in high esteem. Is it any wonder there is a strong popular
movement to shed government work and move it to the private sec-
tor? Today the private sector seems to embody our aspirations and is
seen as the engine of our nation's prosperity and the best way to im-
prove public services.'
1. See, e.g., ELLIOTr D. ScLAR, You DON'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR: THE Eco-
NOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION 2 (2000) ("As a new century begins, the alternative to govern-
ment direction and the employment of public bureaucracy to carry out its commands is a
fresh belief in the social beneficence and effectiveness of the marketplace."); Robert H.
Wessel, Privatization in the United States, 30 Bus. ECON. 45, 45-49 (1995) (noting the increas-
ing rate of privatization in America and citing, as examples, the privatization of waste,
water, and housing management, other municipal services, public schools, hospitals, and
the postal system); Lynette Holloway, Shelters Improve Under Private Groups, Raising a New
Worry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1997, at BI (describing vast improvements in the quality of
services provided by New York City homeless shelters as a result of the city's efforts to
privatize them).
Representative Christopher Shays noted, in hearings concerning the privatization of
welfare reform services:
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When I began this Article, I assumed it would assess characteris-
tics of states' subcontracting legislation. To that end, I prepared a
checklist of what my study of the issues suggested should be contained
in such legislation. Unfortunately for this plan, very few states had
enacted comprehensive legislation. At best, there were a handful of
states that had done so and a patchwork of miscellaneous legislation
in the states that had not.
I was dismayed to discover that I could not write the article I had
envisioned-not for myself and my personal goals, but, rather, for
what this means for the public's welfare. The newspapers are full of
stories of privatization across the country. But as there is almost no
legislation on the subject, privatization is occurring without fore-
thought and without guidance. Far too much is at stake for this to be
the norm.
So circumstances forced this Article to evolve into a template to
assist states in developing their own privatization statutes, an even
more useful project than an after-the-fact assessment.
For there is another side to the story of privatization.
On February 20, 1998, the lights went out in Auckland, New Zea-
land's largest city.2 It would be months before it again had a reliable
supply of power.' Auckland's businesses lost millions of dollars.4
Companies tried to stay open by using noisy generators.5 Diesel
smoke filled the air of fashionable downtown streets.6 Hundreds of
businesses said they would sue Mercury Energy, the private company
that had contracted to supply Auckland's electricity.7
The answers, released by GAO today, provide an important perspective on the
promises and pitfalls of contracting for the private performance of public activi-
ties. According to the study, program officials are motivated by "increasing public
demand for public services and a belief that contractors can provide higher-qual-
ity services more cost-effectively than can public agencies."
Social Services Privatization: The Benefits and Challenges to Child Support Enforcement Programs:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform and Over-
sight, 105th Cong. 3 (1997) [hereinafter Social Services Privatization] (statement of Rep.
Christopher Shays).
2. See James Gray, PAC: Electricity Slowly Returns to NZ's Biggest City, AAP NEWSFEED,
Mar. 2, 1998 (reporting that the failure of two pairs of supply cables interrupted the supply
of electricity to Auckland, New Zealand).
3. See id. (reporting that once the energy supplier repaired Auckland's supply cables,
capacity would be limited to fifty percent until a temporary cable was installed nine or ten
weeks later).
4. See Graham Reid, Last One Out, Please Turn the Lights Back On, OBSERVER (London),
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The cause of the blackout and Mercury's lethargic response ap-
pears to have been that company's drive for increased profits.8 Once
disaster struck, it became clear that Mercury had cut too many cor-
ners. It had failed to do cable maintenance and to have additional
cables in reserve.9 It had allowed cables to remain in place for years
past their normal life."° Mercury had no staff who could perform the
repairs, because it had disbanded its local squads of cable-jointers,
who had then left the country in search of work.1 Mercury had to
locate people with the necessary skills and then fly them in from Aus-
tralia to make repairs, for not enough repair people with the neces-
sary skills remained in New Zealand. 2
Just a few months earlier, Californians greeted the new year with
the news that a contractor had left the state park reservation system in
shambles and had absconded with nearly $1 million of public
money.13 Once the contractor ceased its operations, California was
forced to close its reservation service, and no new reservations could
be made.14 This was a potential disaster for a state that depends on
tourism.15 Even when the private company was accepting reserva-
tions, its workers were unable to provide callers with information
about parks, because the business was located outside California, and
some reservation clerks had never been in the state.1 6
8. See Will Hutton, Darkness at the Heart of Privatisation, OBSERVER (London), Mar. 8,
1998, at 24 ("Mercury's commercial objective has not been to distribute electricity. It has
been to raise the financial returns from its assets, lift its cash flow and so finance its ambi-
tion to take over its rivals .... ).
9. See id. (stating that other large cities in New Zealand had up to ten supply cables in
comparison to Auckland's four); Reid, supra note 4 (reporting that "there is the firm belief
the company has spent its time and energy on corporate matters rather than on the
smaller things-such as maintenance of cables").
10. See Denise McNabb & Yvonne Martin, Blacking Out a City, DOMINION (Wellington,
N.Z.), Feb. 23, 1998, at 11 (reporting that the Auckland Electric Power Board, which was
Mercury Energy's predecessor, warned Mercury in 1990 that the cables needed to be
replaced).
11. See Reid, supra note 4, at 9.
12. See id.
13. See Virginia Ellis, Bankrupt Firm Allegedly Kept State Park Fees, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31,
1997, at Al (discussing the investigation into Destinet Services Corporation, a private com-
pany that filed for bankruptcy and then failed to turn over $1 million in state fees).
14. See Editorial, A Tighter Rein on Privatization, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1998, at M4.
15. Cf Ellis, supra note 13, at Al ("California's park system accommodates about 73
million visitors a year.").
16. Speaking from personal experience, when I made reservations using these services,
the workers were unable to answer any questions about the parks and their facilities. The
worker with whom I spoke responded to my questions by explaining that she was working
out of a call center not located in California, and that she had never been to California.
The workers could provide only the most basic service: making reservations. They could
not satisfy park visitors' other needs.
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And, yet a few months earlier, in Professional Engineers in California
Government v. Department of Transportation,17 the Supreme Court of Cal-
ifornia found that the Department of Transportation had been ille-
gally contracting out engineering work. 8 The court noted that the
contracted-out work had cost almost twice as much as having the work
done by public employees. 9 The decision in Professional Engineers af-
firms the potential for poorly thought-out subcontracting decisions
that save no money and harm the public. Even worse, the circum-
stances under which the Department of Transportation made the sub-
contracting decisions raise concerns that some degree of corruption
might have been involved-that the contracts were let in return for
campaign donations or on the basis of cronyism.2 ° Regardless of
whether these rumors could ever be substantiated, the cost of subcon-
tracting the work to a private consultant was, as the court observed,
almost double that of having the work done by state employees.2'
States may suffer from errors involving privatization in other
ways. For example, Missouri taxpayers faced the possibility of being
held financially liable for the beating of Missouri inmates by employ-
ees of a private prison company in Texas and for costs and fees to
defend the resulting lawsuits.22 And more can be lost than just
17. 936 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1997).
18. See id. at 492 (upholding the trial court's refusal to modify a 1990 injunction that
prevented the Department of Transportation (Caltrans) from contracting with private en-
gineering firms); id. at 480 (noting the trial court's decision that Caltrans's illegal conduct
consisted of "displacing civil service staff from project development work that staff had
historically performed and... maintaining staff at an inadequate level to create an artifi-
cial need for private contracting").
19. See id. at 491 (citing a study plaintiffs submitted to the trial court indicating that the
annual cost for one state employee was $70,000 to $75,000, and the cost of a private con-
sultant was $138,000).
20. Professional Engineers details the Department of Transportation's efforts to contract
out this work in defiance of the law-not only once, but again and again. Id. at 478-80.
21. See supra note 19. These problems are not isolated. See, e.g., SCLAR, supra note 1, at
87 (noting that, in Denver, privately run bus costs increased 100% in the same period that
the costs of publicly run lines increased 11%). There are many similar experiences. In
1991, for example, Los Angeles canceled a five-year vehicle-repair contract after an audit
showed that the service had cost $1 million more than expected and had not performed up
to the contract's standards. County Cancels Biggest Contract in Wake of Audit, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
6, 1991, at B2 [hereinafter County Cancels Contract]. Prior to cancelling the contract, Los
Angeles County incurred millions of dollars in unanticipated expenses due to contract
overruns. Judy Pasternak, County Coughs Up $1.2 Million Extra for Fleet, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22,
1989, at BI.
22. Don Rudd, Will Privatization Cause Costs to Soar, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Nov. 26,
1997, at B7. Illinois, recognizing the inherent problems in privatizing prisons, has banned
this process:
The General Assembly hereby finds and declares that the management and oper-
ation of a correctional facility or institution involves functions that are inherently
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money. Residents of Ellijay, Georgia learned that "three years worth
of water quality records were falsified by the private company operat-
ing their sewer system. '23 The British suffered even more: illness and
death followed problems linked to subcontracting. 24
These stories have been repeated across the country and around
the world. They are mentioned here not to condemn privatization as
inherently bad, but rather to highlight the need for caution and cir-
cumspection in subcontracting. Serious, even deadly, consequences
hang on these decisions. Because privatization has been taking place
for a sufficiently long period of time, one would expect the process to
be well-regulated. The shocking truth is that it is not regulated in the
overwhelming majority of states and barely regulated in the rest.25
This is imprudent at best and is a disaster waiting to happen at worst.
Unfortunately, what we have seen since at least the 1980s has
been a massive movement to privatize public services of all kinds,26
governmental. The imposition of punishment on errant citizens through incar-
ceration requires the State to exercise its coercive police powers over individuals
and is thus distinguishable from privatization in other areas of government. It is
further found that issues of liability, accountability and cost warrant a prohibition
of the ownership, operation or management of correctional facilities by for-profit
private contractors.
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 140/2 (West 1999); cf U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC PRISONS: STUDIES COMPARING OPERATIONAL COSTS AND/OR QUALITY OF SERVICE
2 n.4 (Aug. 1996) [hereinafter PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS] (noting that the privatization
of correctional facilities has engendered debate on whether the operation of prisons, an
aspect of the administration of justice, is "not appropriately delegable to the private
sector").
23. Rudd, supra note 22, at B7.
24. See Sean Poulter, In Wake of E. Coli Tragedy, Water Firms Come Under Fire, DAILY MAIL
(London), Aug. 18, 1999, at 5 (citing allegations that privatized water companies were
responsible for "tens of thousands of illnesses" caused by inadequate sewage treatment);
Private Water Health Risks Hushed Up, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 9, 1997, at 2 [hereinaf-
ter Private Water] (reporting that "Britain's private water companies have put public health
at risk on more than 500 occasions over the past six years").
25. Only Alaska, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mas-
sachusetts, Montana, and Utah provide anything approaching comprehensive regulation
of government subcontracting. SeeALASKA STAT. §§ 36.30.005 to 36.30.020 (Michie 1992 &
Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-50-501 to 24-50-513 (West Supp. 2000); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 1-1181.5b to 1-1181.7 (1999 & Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-5501 to
12-5511 (1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45A.550 to 45A.554 (Banks-Baldwin 2000); id.
§ 11A.130 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:193 to 49:196 (West 1987 &
Supp. 2000); MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, §§ 52-56 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 2-8-301 to 2-8-304, 2-18-1206 (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-55a-1 to 63-55a-3, 63-
95-102, 63-95-401 to 63-95-403 (1997 & Supp. 2000). Other states have piecemeal legisla-
tion directed to specific programs. Some of these less ambitious attempts at privatization
legislation are discussed throughout this Article.
26. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS LEARNED BY STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 2 (1997) [hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED] (discussing a survey by the
1993 Council of State Governments that "found that state agencies responsible for social
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without the benefit of uniform and well thought-through regulation.
The claims made for the benefits of privatization are many and
portentous. Privatization is supposed to have all the virtues attributed
to the market and competition-to provide the best service at the low-
est price. Some hold these assumptions so strongly that several years
ago, and even now, it was possible to claim-and face no demand for
proof-that the public sector is always inefficient and more costly, and
that the private sector always provides superior services.2 7
The ideas that privatization is always better and can foster any
goal has even been incorporated in, or at least has shaped, legislation
in some states. For example, the goals of privatizing the "Arizona
works" program for welfare recipients are:
1. Fostering the development of responsible and productive
citizens through program administration that provides par-
ticipants with incentives to achieve self-sufficiency.
2. Making certain administrative processes more efficient
and cost-effective.
3. Encouraging innovative partnerships with organizations
that enhance the Arizona works program.
services, transportation, mental health care, corrections, health, and education had all in-
creased privatization activities since 1988" and explaining that "the survey results indicated
a trend toward expanded privatization across major state agencies"); see also ROBERT
HEBDON, THE PERILS OF PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS FOR NEW YORK STATE 2 (Dec. 1994) (ex-
plaining that "[ i] n New York State an attempt has been made by privatization ideologues to
create a climate of inevitability around the transfer of otherwise public services to the pri-
vate sector"); id at 6-15 (discussing the types of groups supporting privatization and
describing the claimed advantages of a move toward contracting out government services).
Privatization is heavily promoted. For example, AIC Conferences sponsored a confer-
ence in 1995, saying: "THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR ARE ENORMOUS. With
the growth in public-private partnerships, asset sales, employee stock ownership programs
and the contracting out of government services, the time is right to position yourself for
success and PROFIT." Letter from Stavroula Gouliaditis, Senior Conference Manager, AIC
Conferences I (May 1995). The two-day conference cost $1295 to attend.
27. For such an important issue, there have been few useful, comprehensive, nonparti-
san studies. Even studies that find lower costs for privatization have, upon investigation,
not provided guidance to other jurisdictions considering privatization. For example, the
General Accounting Office (GAO) found that studies concerning prison privatization of-
fered "little generalizable guidance for other jurisdictions about what to expect regarding
comparative operational costs and quality of service." PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS, supra
note 22, at 3. The GAO's report found that some studies focused only on "specialized
inmate populations"; others had serious methodological weaknesses, such as "using hypo-
thetical facilities or nonrandom survey samples"; contexts differed so greatly among states
that the individual studies might not apply outside the state in which the study took place;
other factors, such as the age of the system studied, also had an impact on the studies. Id.
at 3-4; see also HEBDON, supra note 26, at 25-27 (discussing the problems associated with
statistical studies on privatization).
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4. Providing an opportunity for a system that is heavily de-
pendent on human interaction and subjective determina-
tions to offer performance incentives for employees and the
flexibility to hire and promote successful individuals.
5. Ensuring that applicants who are qualified for benefits in
the department of economic security empower redesign pro-
gram, including any income disregards, are automatically
qualified for the Arizona works program.28
While some of these goals may be reasonable for such a program,
there is nothing about privatizing the program that necessarily would
lead to achieving them or to achieving them more successfully than
would public administration-particularly goals (1), (4), and (5).
Logic and a more realistic assessment of market processes suggest
that privatization is likely to have the sort of flaws that all human insti-
tutions do. Indeed, greater experience with privatization has already
provided the opportunity for a better, more realistic understanding of
public services and subcontracting to which an overly simplified the-
ory should give way. We know that spectacular privatization failures
have occurred, costing taxpayers money and lost services. 29 The ques-
tion is how to use this knowledge to prevent failure, and, when failure
nonetheless happens, how to soften its impact.
Even those strongly committed to the market should not be op-
posed to creating safeguards for subcontracting. This is certainly an
area in which ideological lines are drawn. However, it is easy to see
that blind ideological commitment to privatization creates a danger of
victimization. Much is at stake when public work is subcontracted, so
it should also be easy to accept that it is wise to be cautious.
On the other side, rigid opposition is not appropriate. Govern-
ment has always contracted with the private sector for some services
and goods it would rather buy than make, such as paper, computers,
pens, and many other items readily available on the market. However,
the fact that some items can be successfully purchased in the market
does not mean that all can. The problem is ascertaining which can be
28. Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-342(B) (West Supp. 1999).
29. See supra notes 2-25 and accompanying text (discussing examples of failures in
privatization). Among these failures are enormous cost overruns and the flouting of envi-
ronmental and other laws by subcontractors. SeeJoshua Wolf Shenk, The Perils of Privatiza-
tion, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1995, at 16 (describing cost overruns of millions of dollars in
cases where the government used contracts that contained incentives for contractors to
overcharge the government). For example, Rockwell International illegally stored and
dumped toxic and radioactive waste at the Department of Energy's facilities in Rocky Flats,
Colorado. Id. at 17-18.
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best provided by the market and which cannot. Law can help deci-
sionmakers sort through the data involved.
Recent experiences with privatization have given us the ability to
generate a more realistic-hence, a more complex-understanding
of the nature of government services. Economist Elliott Sclar points
out that the debate over how to provide public services offers "a valua-
ble opportunity to meaningfully improve public service."3 Sclar fur-
ther explains that "It] he debate .. .presents us with a rare chance to
move the issue of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public
service provision from the policy back burner to the front."31
Hardline ideology, simplistic theories, and slogans make it easy to
draw lines and make decisions, but not necessarily good ones. A poli-
tician may believe that she can better advance her career by making
an unsupported claim to have saved the taxpayers money by con-
tracting out public services than by explaining the nuances of market
theory-and she would probably be right. News stories announcing
subcontracting decisions and projected savings are likely to be front
page material, while reports of subsequent problems are more likely
to be buried. An agency that privatizes may be able to cut its costs, but
only by quietly and less visibly shifting them to another agency or to
the public. As tempting as it is to avoid the complex decisions neces-
sary to decide whether a specific service is best provided by the public
or private sector, legislators know that they have a responsibility not to
waste public money, and they certainly do not want to be accused of
causing waste by making ill-advised, poorly thought-through decisions.
In addition, some municipalities must be given express authority
by their state legislatures to privatize government functions:
Under governing principles of law, political subdivisions of a
state cannot engage in any activity unless they have received
explicit authority from the state legislature. The only excep-
tion to this rule exists where a locality has received "home
rule" power either in the state constitution or from the state
legislature. A locality that possesses "home rule" may initiate
legislative programs without prior approval from the legisla-
ture. It seems relatively clear that the decision to contract
with private firms for the provision of a particular good or
service would be subject to this rule of plenary state power.
Thus, a locality that desired to privatize one or more of its
functions would presumably have to receive explicit author-
ity to do so or would have to possess "home rule" power.
30. ScI.AR, supra note 1, at 5.
31. Id.
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The scope of "home rule" is itself somewhat ambiguous,
though courts are likely to include within that category any
activity that has minimal effects outside the jurisdiction. A
home rule locality might be able, for instance, to contract
out for street paving services, while a non-home rule locality
might be able to do so only if it had explicit authority from
the legislature.1
2
Subcontracting legislation may thus do more than simply assist munic-
ipalities; it may be required by state law.
The time is long overdue for comprehensive subcontracting law
in every state. Privatization is likely to remain popular. If states con-
tinue to subcontract with no suitable law to provide the guidance that
experience tells us is necessary, waste and poor service are likely to
result. At worst, there may be disasters. This Article advances a tem-
plate for those states that want both to consider privatization and to
protect the public interest. It does so by advancing procedures that
states should establish for assessing whether to subcontract and by
describing safeguards and oversight mechanisms that states could use
to ensure that, if subcontracting takes place, disasters do not occur.
Examples of current state legislation are used to assess how states are
in fact meeting or failing to meet these fundamental requirements.
I. DESIGNING A TEMPLATE FOR SUBCONTRACTING LEGISLATION
Privatization itself is a blanket term that includes different forms
of shifting from publicly to privately produced goods and services.
Professor Paul Starr explained:
Policies that encourage such a shift include (1) the cessation
of public programs and disengagement of government from
specific kinds of responsibilities; (2) sales of pubic assets, in-
cluding public lands, public infrastructure, and public enter-
prises; (3) financing private provision of services-for
example, through contracting out or vouchers-instead of
directly producing them; and (4) deregulating entry into ac-
tivities that were previously treated as a public monopoly."
32. Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limitations on Privatization,
46 Am.J. COMp. L. 481, 501 (1998). Kansas, for example, permits municipalities to privat-
ize "any capital intensive public service" that the municipality may legally provide. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 12-5502 (1991).
33. PAUL STARR, ECON. POL'Y INST., THE LIMITS OF PRIVATIZATION 2 (1987); see also LES-
SONS LEARNED, supra note 26, at I (stating that privatization can take many forms, the most
common of which is contracting).
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Here, the focus will be almost solely on the third-contracting out or
subcontracting-and, to some degree, on the first.
Beyond soliciting bids and awarding contracts to the lowest bid-
der, is there anything more that should be considered in subcontract-
ing? If so, what and why? To answer these questions, it is first helpful
to step back for a quick overview of some of the economic issues in-
volved when considering public versus private provision of goods and
services. All too often, an appealing but overly simplistic model of the
market is used as a basis for explaining privatization-one that stops
at competition and never goes on to take into account the well-known
problems that occur when markets do not work. For anyone who
doubts that there are such problems, just considerjokes about military
purchases of toilet seats and screwdrivers. In fact, defense department
purchases can be thought of as a massive privatization scheme in
which the government tries to get private companies to meet specifica-
tions as to quantity, quality, and price, and in which there have been
constant failures to achieve these specifications. Such failures warn us
that having the private sector provide services will not automatically
solve all problems of quality and cost.
Privately provided services are nothing new. In fact, there has
always been a tension in United States history and elsewhere over
whether the government or the private sector can best buy or produce
a service or product. In other words, privatization is not a big new
thing that will remake the world.
Economists and others have concluded that many services can
only be effectively provided by government-for example, where con-
tinuity of service is essential, where no profits are generated, and
where no competition exists or can exist."4 Many government services
are natural monopolies where there is naturally no competition and,
thus, no market impetus for improved service at lower cost. In addi-
tion, in some situations, bigger does mean cheaper, and the first big
provider can drive all competitors out of business because it can un-
dercut their prices and still make a profit. Once it has a monopoly,
such a provider can then charge whatever price it wishes. In this situa-
tion, the public cannot rely on the market, but instead needs govern-
ment to run or regulate the natural monopoly.
Indeed, it is for these sorts of reasons that many services came to
be provided by the government. Welfare, child protective services,
34. See, e.g., SCLAR, supra note 1, at 24-28 (noting that services such as national defense,
fire protection, and the operation of lighthouses share characteristics that make them ill-
suited for privatization).
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road construction and maintenance, public health, education, and
many others began as private services, but problems of corruption,
predatory pricing, and poor quality eventually led the government to
take them over in an effort to promote the public welfare.3 5 Other
related problems led to the establishment of the Civil Service and its
rules, which attempt to prevent corruption and ensure that govern-
mental employees serve the public interest.3 6
It is always a mistake to assume without investigation that the past
can teach us nothing. Before engaging in a single-minded pursuit of
privatization, it is worthwhile to consider whether these problems ex-
isted only under very different circumstances, or whether we may be
blindly heading down a track where we will be condemned to repeat
the lessons of the past.
We need to ask: when markets are not competitive, can the pri-
vate sector improve on public sector performance even as it falls short
of the competitive ideal?37 Although it is possible to attempt to create
a market by dividing a public service into smaller units, doing so may
lead to greater inefficiency, lack of coordination, duplication, and, as
a result, greater expense. Indeed, competition may not be possible in
all parts of the country and may be a particular problem in rural areas
and where technical expertise is needed. Such areas may suffer from
cherry-picking, which occurs when private companies are allowed to
operate only the profitable parts of a service, leaving the government
to operate those that are most expensive.
Many public services are public goods. In economists' terms,
these services generate positive externalities-they have positive side
35. See id. at 1 (explaining that at the turn of the twentieth century, "[s) tate power was
the only countervailing force capable of checking the antisocial excesses of the emergent
class of economic oligarchs or 'robber barons' spawned by the new industrialization"). See
generally Moshe Adler, The Origins of Governmental Production: Cleaning the Streets of New York
by Contract During the 19th Century (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(describing the problems with private delivery of services at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury that led to government provision of services).
36. See Lydia Segal, Can We Fight the New Tammany Hall?: Difficulties of Prosecuting Political
Patronage and Suggestionsfor Reform, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 507, 508 (1998) (explaining that, in
response to the system of political patronage that persisted in the mid-1800s, reformers
pushed for passage of the Civil Service Act of 1883, hoping to "closely regulat[e] how
employees could be hired, fired, promoted, and demoted").
37. See CRAIG RICHARDS Er AL., ECON. POL'Y INST., RisKY BUSINESS: PRIVATE MANAGEMENT
OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS 141 (1996) (suggesting that this line of inquiry is appropriate); see also
SCLAR, supra note 1, at 69-93 (arguing that many privatization contracts benefit monopolies
or oligopolies, and thus one must consider the real-world play of the market in making
individual decisions about privatizing services).
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effects that cannot be confined only to those who pay for them.38 Vac-
cination, for example, protects both the one vaccinated and others
who are less likely to contract the disease, because the pool of poten-
tial carriers is smaller. Street lighting is another classic example. Edu-
cation benefits not only the one who receives it, but also those who
gain by having a more educated populace. Public goods create a
temptation to become a free rider, to get the benefits without paying.
Under these circumstances, soon no one will be willing to pay for the
service or good, so it must be provided by government if it is to be
provided at all.39
In many cases, government services are ones for which price com-
petition is not as important as ensuring guaranteed results. We want
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to track down and prevent
threats to the public health far more than we want that agency to op-
erate cheaply or at a profit. A private vendor may not have as much
interest in controlling disease as in increasing the price of its stock
and returning value to its shareholders.
Finally, a subcontractor's need to add profit and its higher cost of
borrowing create a hurdle that makes it harder for the private sector
to deliver projects and services at lower cost.4° Indeed, a March 1994
38. See ROBERT HEILBRONER & LESTER THUROW, ECONOMICS EXPLAINED: EVERYTHING
You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT How THE ECONOMY WORKS AND WHERE IT'S GOING 189-90 (rev.
ed. 1994) (discussing the importance of computing "good" and "bad" externalities).
39. Elliott Sclar provides a different breakdown differentiating public services from pri-
vate markets. See ScLAR, supra note 1, at 23-28, 47-49. Sclar speaks of goods that are exclud-
able and rivalrous. See id. at 23-26. Private goods are both. That is, one who has the
goods-Sclar uses the example of a theater ticket-can exclude others from its use, and
there is competition for the good. Id. at 23-24. Pure public goods are nonexcludable. Id.
at 24. Sclar uses the example of a lighthouse. Id. Just because one ship uses the light does
not mean that another cannot use it. Some goods, however, fall between the two so that
there is some potential degree of excludability and rivalrousness. Id. at 24-25. These may
be provided in part by private vendors, but also by the public service. See id. Sclar con-
tends that what sets these apart from purely private goods is that they generate externali-
ties. Id. at 25. For example, he says, mail service can be provided in part by private
carriers, but such carriers cannot and will not take up the cost of providing service to the
extent that the Postal Service does; in addition, having a uniform, low-cost mail system
generates positive benefits that a number of systems do not. See id. This quality makes it
reasonable for the good or service to be provided publicly. See id.
40. Indeed, the Freedom from Government Competition Act of 1997 implicitly recog-
nized this. See H.R. 716, 105th Cong. (1997). This Act would have required federal agen-
cies to procure all goods and services from the private sector, id. § 3(a), except for those
that are "inherently governmental in nature," id. § 3(c) (1) (A), or deemed important to
national security, see id. § 3(c) (2). Under the Act, federal agencies could have also used
government goods and services where the private sector fails to meet government needs,
id. § 3(c) (4), or where government provides the best value, id. § 3(c) (3). Joan M. Flynn,
Federal Employees: Outsourcing Proposal for Government Encounters Criticism from White House,
1997 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 120, at D-17 (June 23, 1997).
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General Accounting Office (GAO) report showed that the govern-
ment could enjoy substantial savings by directly performing certain
functions rather than by subcontracting the work to private
companies.41
This is not to say that all work currently performed by govern-
ment must stay with government. Rather, we must recognize that, just
as there are things the private sector does well, there are rational rea-
sons why government has come to perform many services, and, if we
examine a service objectively, we may decide that these reasons re-
quire it to remain publicly provided. The question is how to provide
that objective scrutiny.
Subcontracting legislation should address both substantive con-
cerns, that is, the benchmarks and standards to be applied to measure
performance, as well as procedural concerns, that is, establishing a
fair, honest, and reasonable way to make decisions as to subcontract-
ing. Uniform substantive criteria that establish benchmarks that sub-
contracting must achieve assist the decisionmaker who otherwise lacks
guidance in deciding certain questions. Such criteria also ensure that
reasoned decisions are made, that oversight can be and is exercised,
and that the public welfare is protected if problems arise and a con-
tract must be terminated. Indeed, here, as elsewhere with privatiza-
tion, simple remedies may not be effective. Merely terminating a
contract may not be a useful remedy if the contractor would prefer
that result to having to meet the contract's requirements. 42 Procedu-
ral safeguards provide a reasonable process that ensures that decision-
making is transparent, due process is given, and the public interest is
furthered.
Substantive criteria and procedural safeguards foster uniform
procedures within a state43 and can allow decisionmakers to capitalize
on an administration that is trained and experienced. Protective mea-
sures can ensure that subcontracting does not take place on an ad hoc
41. Chris Hanna, Federal Employees: Unions Say Contracting Out Cuts Services, Saves No
Money, 1997 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 191, at D-20 (Oct. 2, 1997). See generally U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OVERHEAD COSTS: UNALLOWABLE AND QUESTIONABLE COSTS CHARGED
BY GENERAL CONrRACTORS (1994).
42. This was the case with Educational Alternatives, Inc., (EAI) regarding its contract
with the Baltimore school system. RICHARDS ET AL., supra note 37, at 154. See generally
Memorandum from Alva Rivera, Vice President, San Diego Teachers Association (SDTA),
to SDTA Board of Directors (Dec. 1, 1993) (on file with author) (discussing the six major
components of the EAI program and reporting sixteen particular problems or concerns
with the program).
43. Cf LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 26, at 10 (discussing the opinions of officials of six
state governments that "once political leaders introduce privatizations, they need to estab-
lish a formal structure to ensure effective implementation").
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or after-the-fact basis. Freeing decisionmakers from having to invent
criteria in each instance also frees them from worries that they might
have overlooked relevant factors. Put together, this also means that
the process can be more streamlined, less cumbersome, and less
costly.
II. SUBSTANTIVE CRITERIA
Substantive criteria must address problems that experiences with
subcontracting have revealed. States that have legislated subcontract-
ing standards provide useful insights into the range of requirements
to be included. Once these substantive criteria are developed, they
can be inserted throughout the process of making privatization deci-
sions, wherever the decisionmaker feels they are relevant.
A. Determining Policy Goals
States that advocate privatization-rather than taking a more bal-
anced approach-implicitly assume that privatization will always and
automatically achieve improved public service at lower cost. Arizona,
for example, requires that the administration of its welfare program
be contracted out." This demonstrates a strong faith in the value of
privatization, but offers no opportunity to test such faith.
Furthermore, such an approach fails to recognize that the goals
of public service have always been larger than merely providing a ser-
vice at the lowest cost. Public education, for example, is intended to
do more than merely teach reading and writing or simply prepare stu-
dents to join the workforce. It is intended to transmit a sense of
shared identity and to support our democracy by ensuring that all citi-
zens can take on the task of self-governance. The Postal Service deliv-
ers mail, but more important is its role in helping knit a very large
country together and in promoting productivity and democratic en-
gagement by ensuring that all residents in every area, no matter how
remote, can communicate. A highway gets a traveler from point A to
point B, but a network of public highways that reaches even remote,
less traveled areas unites the country and promotes commerce. It is
important, then, to bear in mind that although discrete parts of these
goals can be run at a profit, the whole may not be profitable because
44. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-300.01 (A) (West Supp. 2000) (setting forth the re-
quirement that Arizona contract out its "jobs program"); id. § 46-342(A) (setting forth the
requirement that Arizona contract out its "works program"). The Arizona "jobs program"
provides wage subsidies to employers who hire welfare recipients. Id § 46-299U). The




some parts cannot be made profitable. Furthermore, achieving larger
goals vital to us as a nation may be priceless, but cannot always be
done at a profit. Thus, while it is possible to educate people, deliver
mail, and operate tollroads at a profit, it is not necessarily possible to
educate all people, deliver all mail, and provide a network of highways
and make a profit. Indeed, for many of these services, the value of
having the whole system is far greater than the sum of its parts-and,
particularly, of its profitable parts. Although monetary value is impor-
tant, there is no reason to think that these traditional goals of govern-
ment are no longer worthy of defending. Thus, where these goals
conflict, a decision must be made as to which trumps the other and
how all are to be accommodated.
Some jurisdictions have taken a more holistic view of privatization
and its goals than has Arizona. The District of Columbia, for example,
requires a demonstration that privatization involving services essential
to health or safety will not "adversely affect the recipients."45 Massa-
chusetts expresses a particularly wide range of goals in its privatization
policy:
The general court hereby finds and declares that using pri-
vate contractors to provide public services formerly provided
by state employees does not always promote the public inter-
est. To ensure that citizens of the commonwealth receive
high quality public services at low cost, with due regard for
the taxpayers of the commonwealth and the needs of public
and private workers, the general court finds it necessary to
regulate such privatization contracts ... 46
Massachusetts is not at the opposite end of Arizona; it does not forbid
subcontracting. But it is at the opposite end in looking at privatiza-
tion with open eyes rather than with blind faith.
B. Preventing Fraud, Criminal Activities, and the Spoils System Redux
States face a number of risks when fraud, criminal activities, and
neo-spoils systems arise in connection with privatization. First, the
presence of these problems means that services are not being pro-
vided, value is not being received, or revenues are being siphoned off.
In addition, if care is not taken, a state may find itself legally liable for
a contractor's misdeeds as well as practically liable when it must make
45. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 1-1181.5b(a)(9) (1999 & Supp. 2000); see also D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-1191.3(b)(6) (1999) (establishing the requirement that the contracting out of fleet
management services for the police department must not "adversely affect the delivery of
services to District residents").
46. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, § 52 (West 1996).
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up any shortfall.47 These problems must be addressed before con-
tracting out.
Most fundamentally, subcontracting legislation must be proac-
tive. It must bar individuals and companies who have engaged in past
criminal activities.48 History shows instances in which services con-
tracted for have not been performed or outright theft and misfea-
sance have occurred.4 9 Other service providers have violated laws,
including safety requirements.50 Some have been repeat violators. 51
Considering the essential nature of most government services and the
sensitive content of others, those entrusted with performing them
must not use their positions as an opportunity to loot the public cof-
fers or put the public health and welfare at risk; legislatures cannot
47. See, e.g., infra note 68 (describing a situation which the state of Michigan became
liable for debts incurred by a terminated contractor).
48. A failure to do so can open a governmental entity to great liability. For example,
Michigan recently awarded a contract to Correctional Medical Services, Inc. (CMS), of St.
Louis, a company that was under indictment for causing the death of an inmate in North
Carolina. See Dwight F. Blint, Medical Miscues Cited at Prison, HARTFORD CouRANT, Aug. 26,
2000, at Al (discussing the legal problems of CMS and noting that the company was
charged with manslaughter in connection with an incident that occurred in a North Caro-
lina prison); Union Sues over Prisoner Medical Care, S. BEND TRIB., May 26, 2000, at D4 (not-
ing that the United Auto Workers filed suit against Michigan, "claiming prisoner health
could suffer" if the state privatized health care services for inmates by entering into a con-
tract with CMS). One of CMS's doctors, who lost his license to practice in Michigan for
having sex with patients, was hired by the company to run statewide psychiatric services in
Alabama. SeeJudy Putnam, UAW Sues to Stop Prison Health-Care Plan, ANN ARBOR PRESS, May
26, 2000, at http://aa.mlive.com/index.ssP/news/stories/20000525private.frm. An opin-
ion from an Idaho judge stated that care provided by the company had been more like
physical torture than incarceration" in the case of one inmate. Id.
Los Angeles County, in a somewhat similar case, fired a vehicle-repair contractor for
poor performance and for costing the county $1 million more than the contract amount.
See County Cancels Contract, supra note 21, at B2. At the time the contract was formed, the
contractor was being investigated for "criminal activity in the management of a $250-mil-
lion service contract at Redstone Arsenal, the Army's missile headquarters in Huntsville,
Alabama." Victor Merina, L.A. County Pact with Holmes & Naruer Is Upheld Despite Federal
Probe ofFirm, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 1988, at D6. The activity was alleged to have included a
262% overcharge. Id Despite this knowledge, ardently pro-privatization city counsel mem-
bers decided to enter into the contract. See id.
49. See generally ScLAR, supra note 1, passim (discussing examples of privatization efforts
that failed due to the incompetence or misfeasance of the contractor). Examples of such
incidents also appear throughout this Article.
50. See, e.g., Blint, supra note 48, at Al (discussing the many fines levied against a pri-
vate prison provider for repeated failure to follow medical safety requirements); Rudd,
supra note 22, at B7 (reporting that in Ellijay, Georgia, three years worth of water quality
records were falsified by the private company responsible for sewage treatment); Private
Water, supra note 24, at 2 (indicating that private water companies in the United Kingdom
put public health at risk over 500 times). Other examples may be found throughout this
Article.
51. See supra note 50.
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turn a blind eye to problems such as corruption and illegality no mat-
ter how enticing a low bid may appear.
Other actions, while not crimes, may verge on the fraudulent and
thus subvert the intent of subcontracting. Before awarding a contract,
an investigation should be made to determine whether a subcontract-
ing situation involves real competition and not private employers di-
viding up jobs in such a way as to ensure they do not compete with
one another. This is easy to do when contracts are offered for differ-
ent routes or geographic regions. Although the service is provided in
parts and by apparently different providers, the employers are not re-
ally in competition with one another. For example, ostensibly inde-
pendent bidders on providing bus service in Denver actually had an
interdependent relationship at the national level. 2 As a result, bus
lines run by differently named companies were a de facto monopoly.53
Another recognized problem has been that of patronage. Colo-
rado declares that its policy concerning privatization encourages the
use of private contractors "to achieve increased efficiency ... without
undermining the principles of the state personnel system requiring
competence in state government and the avoidance of political pa-
tronage. 54 It bases this policy on a recognition "that the ultimate
beneficiaries of all government services are the citizens of the state of
Colorado."55 The state legislature therefore declares as its intent "that
privatization of government services not result in diminished quality
in order to save money. "56
Patronage can take many forms in subcontracting. If contractors
employ former government officials, this effectively creates a vested
interest in having contractors and can affect whether decisions are
made in the public interest.5 Therefore, subcontracting legislation
must address whether members of a subcontracting decisionmaking
or oversight body are to be barred from, or limited in accepting, em-
ployment with a contractor. 58  Legislation should also consider
52. See SctLiR, supra note 1, at 87-88.
53. See id. at 87 (explaining that the two providers effectively "controlled the private-
transit market in Denver").
54. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-50-501 (West Supp. 2000).
55. Id.
56. Id.; see also id. § 24-50-503(0 (III) (explaining that in assessing the public's interest
in having services performed by government, the personnel director shall consider "[t]he
extent to which the contracting preserves the principles of competence in government and
the avoidance of political patronage").
57. Cf RlCHARDS ET AL., supra note 37, at 174-75 (noting that conflicts of interest exist
when "[c ] ontractors... employ persons with whom they had previously dealt in an official
capacity").
58. Oklahoma provides an example in its subcontracting legislation:
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whether other parties might be improperly affected if they are allowed
to accept employment with a contractor, even though those parties do
not serve on an oversight or decisionmaking body. An example of
such parties would be high public officials and administrators of an
agency when less than the entire workforce is subcontracted. Those
who continue to administer the unprivatized part of the agency
should perhaps also be barred from accepting employment with a
contractor. 9 In addition, a decision needs to be made as to whether
there should be limits on the ability of any of these administrators,
board members, or officials to work for lobbyists who represent cur-
rent or potential subcontractors or bodies advocating positions on
privatization. Finally, if there are to be bars, details must be worked
out as to their geographic, subject-matter, and time limits.
Even with the best prior investigation, it is possible to have missed
problems with a contractor or to have a problem arise with no prior
evidence. This vulnerability can take two forms. The first is having to
intervene quickly to ensure continuity of service when such problems
arise. The second is limiting governmental liability for the contrac-
tor's misdeeds. Government should not leave itself vulnerable to
these occurrences.
One obvious method of preventing the first form of vulnerability
is requiring contractors to post bonds and secure insurance. Further-
more, when illegalities or tortious actions take place during the term
of a contract or when a serious disqualifying activity is discovered, the
government should have the right to immediately terminate the con-
tract and step in.6° Such a protection may need to be negotiated in
the contract, but should also be provided by law. Other methods of
Any state officer or employee who exercises discretionary or decision-making au-
thority in awarding a privatization contract shall be prohibited for a period of one
(1) year .. . from becoming an officer or employee of a business organization
which is a party to any privatization contract with the state agency in which the
state officer or employee exercised such discretionary or decision-making
authority.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 590 (West Supp. 2001).
59. Cf MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 268A, § 5(a) (West 2000) (prohibiting former state
employees from acting as agents or attorneys for, or receiving compensation from, "anyone
other than the commonwealth or a state agency, in connection with any particular matter
in which the commonwealth or a state agency is a party or has a direct and substantial
interest and in which he participated as a state employee while so employed"). But cf Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § IIA.130 (Banks-Baldwin 2000) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to prohibit an officer or public servant employed by an agency that is privatized
from accepting employment from the person or business which is operating that agency.").
60. Rudd, supra note 22, at B7; see also id. (arguing that absent the ability to terminate,
citizens bear not only the cost of the service, but also tort liability and costs to communities
caused by the replacement of "decent-paying jobs" with low-wage jobs).
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being proactive about these problems are implicit in the other protec-
tions discussed throughout this Article.
Taxpayers must also be protected from liability for the actions of
subcontractors. Some state legislatures have taken steps to ensure that
responsibility remains with the contractor. Colorado, for example,
provides that the contractor bears the liability for its actions and may
not plead sovereign or governmental immunity as affirmative defenses
for any acts arising from the performance of its contract.61 As a solu-
tion, this is not as simple as it may appear. While taxpayers should not
be liable, it may be impossible to avoid paying extra (at least in the
short run) to ensure that other taxpayers do not suffer a loss when the
contractor proves unreliable. In addition to tort or tort-like liability, a
state may find itself ultimately liable for unpaid bills. Michigan, for
example, terminated a contract with its private prison health care pro-
vider, but then found itself liable to pay forty percent more for the
contract of the successor, who had paid off $12 million of its predeces-
sor's unpaid bills.62
In short, it is wise not to be foolishly sanguine about subcontract-
ing and forego the sorts of prudent measures that have been devel-
oped over the years to protect against fraud, criminal activities, and
the spoils system. These measures include investigation, laws that clar-
ify which activities should be of concern, and methods to limit and
remediate any losses.
C. Apples and Oranges: Making Costs Comparable and Making Reliable
Quality and Quantity Assessments
Everyone knows that sales, markdowns, and discounts cannot be
taken at face value. The "original" price may be exaggerated, or the
seller may use a bait and switch tactic, offering an item that may not
be of the same quality or an item that does not offer the range of
features most shoppers would desire. The same ideas apply to
subcontracting.
It is impossible to know if money will be saved without reliable
information about the existing service, the comparable costs, and the
comparative quality of the existing service and the subcontracted ser-
vice. Therefore, a crucial early step in the subcontracting process is
61. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-50-505 (West Supp. 2000); cf Richardson v. McKnight,
521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997) (holding that private prison guards are not entitled to immunity
from suit in actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).
62. Putnam, supra note 48; see also supra note 48 (discussing this incident).
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deciding which costs are properly included.63 Experience has shown
that obtaining precise and complete cost information is no simple
matter; as a result, most governments have used only estimated cost
and performance data in subcontracting. 64 The flaws of such a prac-
tice are clear. Without accurate data, it is impossible to be certain that
subcontracting benefits the taxpayers.
Assuming that accurate and complete cost data for a public ser-
vice is obtained, it is then essential that comparable costs be used in
assessing both the public and private provision of that service. Unfor-
tunately, experience has shown that, for a number of recurring rea-
sons, comparable costs are not always used.
For example, when only part of a service is subcontracted, espe-
cially when that part is less expensive, the government will be left to
provide the more expensive part. Similarly, it would be inappropriate
to compare the costs of running private prisons with government pris-
ons if the private prisons were all low security and the government
prisons were all high security, 65 but this has been done. Thus, part of
comparing and determining costs (just as when individual consumers
shop) is determining whether the quality of the items being compared
is the same.6 6
Another common problem occurs when overhead costs are in-
cluded in the public service's costs (because they are imbedded in the
government department's budget), but are not included in the con-
63. Colorado requires that the costs of providing comparable levels of service be ana-
lyzed. Those costs "include the salaries and benefits of staff that would be needed and the
cost of space, equipment, and material needed to perform the function." CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 24-50-503(1) (a) (I); see also HEBDON, supra note 26, at 27-30 (setting forth a frame-
work for comparing private and public costs when making a decision of whether to priva-
tize a service).
64. See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 26, at 5 ("Most of the governments we surveyed
used estimated cost data because obtaining complete cost and performance data by activity
from their accounting systems was difficult." (footnote omitted)). The report notes that
discussing accounting issues with private firms as part of the process of assessing costs can
be helpful in gaining a better understanding of cost and quality issues. Id. at 13.
65. Cf Shenk, supra note 29, at 21 (explaining that "private prisons are almost exclu-
sively low-security--cheaper to operate than higher security prisons").
66. A similar problem can occur when comparing costs from one state to another.
When attempting to predict or assess subcontracting costs, it may not be possible simply to
extrapolate costs from one state to another. Geraldine Jensen, President of the Association
for Children for Enforcement of Support, contended that Lockheed Martin IMS was re-
ceiving seven times as much money in Maryland as it was in Virginia for doing exactly the
same type of work. Social Services Privatization, supra note 1, at 144 (statement of Geraldine
Jensen). She asked: "Who is responsible for monitoring contracts states have with private
vendors?" Id. Jensen may be correct in her concern, but different states, even adjacent
ones, may have different legislative, economic, and other considerations, which means that
the work provided is not exactly the same.
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tracted-out service's costs, even though those same overhead and over-
sight costs will continue.6" This means that services could be
privatized even though they were actually being done more economic-
ally by public sector workers. Indeed, failing to have comparable cost
accounting makes it impossible to avoid wasting public money. Thus,
subcontracting legislation must require that overhead and other costs
be included in the cost of providing the privatized service if these
costs would continue with a contractor.
Omitting these costs results in more than avoiding mere "bean
counting." If these costs are not included, no oversight may take
place, and, as a result, services may be improperly performed or not
performed at all.6" Unless there is a specific provision for them, over-
sight costs are easily overlooked. Once the service is subcontracted,
these costs might be omitted from the agency's budget. If there is no
money to fund oversight, oversight will not be done.
Privatization proponents might argue that no oversight is neces-
sary, that the market will ensure performance. Albany's experience
with subcontracted vehicle maintenance demonstrated that oversight
is necessary and that the associated costs can be substantial.69 These
costs included spending money to re-engineer the city's voucher and
data-processing system, to buy additional computers, and to employ
additional auditors and expert mechanics.7 °
Proper oversight in the right (or wrong) circumstances may make
the difference between life and death. This is not only a problem in
public sector subcontracting, but rather, it is imbedded as a problem
when different organizations, or even departments, must coordinate
their activities. There is always a danger of things falling through the
cracks, and subcontracting creates cracks in the structure of an enter-
prise. A major cause of the 1996 ValuJet crash was found to be a sub-
contracting arrangement that failed to provide definitively for
oversight of critical maintenance functions.71 Oversight was omitted
67. Some states expressly require that overhead costs be included. See, e.g., Miss. CODE
ANN. § 27-103-209(2) (2000).
68. For example, in February 2000, the Michigan Auditor General reported that the
state had paid $26 million to United Correctional Managed Care of Anaheim, California,
but the company had spent only $17 million on inmate health care, leaving $9 million
unaccounted for. See Putnam, supra note 48. The contract was terminated and the succes-
sor company had to shoulder $12 million in unpaid bills. See id, It then negotiated a 40%
increase in its contract. See id.
69. See SCLAR, supra note 1, at 116-17 (explaining that due to lack of oversight, Albany
was overspending by 20% on privatized vehicle maintenance).
70. Id. at 117.
71. See id. at 16-17 (noting that Valujet outsourced its aircraft maintenance operation
and explaining how the crash was the result of a contractor's improper actions).
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because it appeared to save money;72 however, in hindsight, we can
see that the costs avoided were far less than the financial and human
costs of the crash.
Unless oversight costs are accounted for in a subcontracting
budget, this essential function is likely to be overlooked. On the other
hand, when oversight costs are included, and included at an appropri-
ate level, the government can hire people whose work is dedicated to
oversight, and those paying the bills will be able to determine whether
they are receiving value for their money.
Another easily overlooked cost, but a real one nonetheless, is that
of converting or transferring a service to the private sector. Whether
or not it is formally included in a budget or contract, someone must
bear that cost-a cost which is not trivial. Indeed, it may be large
enough to consume any apparent cost advantage. Arizona's privatiza-
tion legislation mandates that the Office for Excellence in Govern-
ment develop a model to estimate the total costs for providing a state
function and develop a method for comparing those costs to private
sector costs. The model must include costs of "conversion, transac-
tion, disruption, contract monitoring costs, and revenue increases and
decreases related to a privatization." 73 "Total costs" are defined as "all
costs borne by an agency to provide a state function including all indi-
rect costs and applicable allocated costs."' 74 Arizona's legislation, how-
ever, does not require an actual study to ascertain these costs, but
instead only permits such a study to be undertaken.75
The issue of proper cost allocation is complex and for that reason
alone can easily be mishandled. Each agency and state must under-
take a study to identify and accommodate its idiosyncratic needs. In
addition to overhead costs and transfer costs, agencies should include
in their cost allocations training or retraining costs, which will be in-
curred in any transfer to ensure that the contracted-for level of service
is provided.76
72. See id. at 17 (contending that oversight measures that could have prevented the
disaster "would have been more costly and diametrically opposed to [Valujet's] business
plan for maintaining low overhead in order to maintain low prices").
73. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-2773(6) (a) (ii) (West Supp. 2000); cf COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 24-50-503(1) (a) (II), (III) (West Supp. 2000) (excluding "indirect overhead costs"
from the cost comparison, but considering "inspection, supervision, and monitoring").
74. APaz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2771(9) (West 1999).
75. Id. § 41-2773(3).
76. Cf Ky. Riv. STAT. ANN. § 45A.551(3) (d) (2) (e) (Banks-Baldwin 2000) (requiring
that, after a state agency determines a service cannot be provided efficiently by the agency,
the state agency must conduct a cost-benefit analysis as to costs, including retraining costs).
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Even more fundamental to the problem of comparable costs is
recognizing that there are a number of special problems in setting
financial criteria with regard to public services. Privatizing govern-
ment services is founded on the idea that markets set the proper
price, but when there is no market, as when government provides a
service or when there is a monopoly, the price will be too high."
However, there are a number of reasons why there may be no private
market price. Most fundamentally, there may be no market to pro-
vide the sort of services that government does, because many govern-
ment services are public goods. 78 Even where analogous services are
provided privately-the "yellow pages" testT -they may not be fully
comparable. Ostensibly similar services may in fact be different, be-
cause government may have different goals than a private business.8 °
When there is no market for the services to be subcontracted, it be-
comes difficult to feel assured that a proper price has been set.
Testimony by Geraldine Jensen, President of the Association for
Children for Enforcement of Support (ACES), exemplifies this uneas-
iness. Jensen testified that
private vendors appear to vary prices charged for the same
services provided. PSI charged Ohio, $22,130, PA-$34,190,
WV-$20,082, SD-$11,800, AR-$10,000 and RI-7,000 [sic] to re-
view and update their child support guidelines. States seem
to be unaware of the usual market price for services ren-
dered. This information is needed to negotiate contracts.8'
In fact, the differing prices could be the result of truly different
services contracted for in these states and different conditions under
which the contracts must be performed. On the other hand, price
differences of over 50% in adjacent states and as much as 500% from
the lowest to the highest price could be, as Jensen fears, an artifact of
factors other than value provided or cost of rendering the service.
With no market to set the price, it is reasonable to feel uneasy.
77. See generally HEILBRONER & THUROW, supra note 38, at 173-206 (explaining the mar-
ket supply and demand model, rational market behavior, and the problems associated with
monopolies, including increased prices).
78. See id. at 186-89 (defining and discussing public goods).
79. SCLAR, supra note 1, at 29. Sclar notes that a company passes the yellow pages test
"by being one of the categories of potential sellers found in local telephone directories."
Id.
80. Indeed, the government provides many services with the purpose of promoting the
public welfare. Some of the more obvious examples include highway maintenance, trash
collection, and disease control.
81. Social Services Privatization, supra note 1, at 145.
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The second major problem in setting a market price is that many
public services are "priceless" in every sense of the word. Government
services are often spoken of as essential services-so essential, in fact,
that most public employees are not allowed to strike and thereby de-
prive the public of the service.8 2 Strike bans implicitly recognize that
people depend on public services and that they expect such services to
be of the highest quality. Put another way, were public services to be
discontinued or withheld, the public could, effectively, be held hos-
tage or extorted. For example, although trash pickup may seem to be
mundane, undesirable work, we all know that failure to pick up and
dispose of trash properly creates serious health risks. Even less fre-
quent pickups-for example, monthly instead of weekly pickups-
may be insufficient to insure public health. Water is another exam-
ple. We all depend on access to a sufficient amount of uncontami-
nated water. It would be absurd to think that people would support
privatization, no matter how much money it would save, if it meant
receiving contaminated water and inadequate supplies-a problem
that occurred with the privatization of water in England."3
Continuity of service certainly must be included among impor-
tant nonfinancial considerations. Public agencies must consider how
continuity can be assured when work is performed by a private con-
tractor whose workers have the right to organize, bargain collectively,
and strike.8 4 For those states in which public sector workers do not
currently have the right to bargain collectively or to strike, privatiza-
tion will necessitate a major change in relationships. It will mean that
the employees of privatized agencies will fall under the jurisdiction of
82. See DONALD H. WOLLETr ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
252-87 (4th ed. 1993) (discussing rationales advanced in support of such non-strike
policies).
83. See Poulter, supra note 24, at 5 (discussing the illness and death that occurred after
a private British firm failed to clean up sewage, which resulted in the sewage being
pumped into the sea); Private Water, supra note 24, at 2 (noting that Britain's private water
companies placed the public health at risk "on more than 500 occasions over the past six
years"). The water pollution even became an important electoral issue. See Frank Dobson
MP, Ending The Waste: Labour's Plans for a World Class, Water-Efficient, Sustainable Water Indus-
ty, UNIVERSAL NEWS SERVS., Nov. 19, 1996 (criticizing the privatization decision and setting
forth the methods by which the Labour Party could remedy the harmful results of the
decision); Phil Murphy, Labour Concern over Water Contamination, PRESS Ass'N NEWSFILE,
Sept. 26, 1996 (discussing the Labour Party's criticisms of the British government for fail-
ing to prosecute those responsible for the contamination of drinking water).
84. Indeed, the right of private sector workers to strike was cited by the Justice Depart-
ment as a reason not to privatize certain prison facilities. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS,
supra note 22, at 1 (citing Letter from the Assistant Attorney General for Administration,
Department of Justice, to various congressional committee and subcommittee chairmen
and ranking minority members (June 5, 1996)).
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the NLRA and will have the rights to bargain collectively and to
strike.
8 5
If public work is indeed essential, then subcontracting decisions
cannot be based solely or primarily on cost, and the need to set quali-
tative benchmarks cannot be ignored. An important step prior to ad-
vertising for bids is setting measurable quantitative and qualitative
standards. Such standards can be developed as part of setting a base-
line, as discussed below. As difficult as it can be to account for all
costs, setting qualitative standards is much more difficult. The GAO's
discussion of quality standards, applied in studies of prison privatiza-
tion, provides some good examples of the sorts of problems that must
be dealt with:
The concept of "quality" is neither easily defined nor mea-
sured. For example, although the American Correctional As-
sociation (ACA) sets accreditation standards for prisons,
accredited facilities can vary widely in terms of overall qual-
ity. According to ACA officials, such variances occur because
ACA accreditation means that a facility has met minimum
standards.
Generally, however, assessments of quality can take several
approaches. For example, one is a compliance approach,
that is, assessing whether or to what extent the prisons being
compared are in compliance with applicable ACA standards
and/or ... court orders and consent decrees. Another ap-
proach is to assess performance measures. For example,
measures of safety could include assault statistics, safety in-
spection results, and accidental injury reports.8 6
When the GAO reviewed surveys of both correctional staff and
inmates concerning the quality of services at private and public institu-
tions, it found that the results directly contradicted one another.8 "
Neither was right nor wrong; they just had different needs and inter-
ests. This demonstrates both the difficulty of trying to make qualitative
assessments of complex services objective, and thus comparable, and
also illustrates the importance of relying on multiple sources to attain
a full quality assessment.88
85. See infra text accompanying note 146.
86. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS, supra note 22, at 4-5 (footnote omitted).
87. See id. at 9 (noting that the correctional staff reported that the private prison "out-
performed" the public facilities, while inmates reported that one of the public facilities
"outperform [ed]" the private facility in all dimensions except "inmate activities").
88. See id. at 13 ("[I] t is important to use multiple indicators or data sources to provide
cross-checks. The New Mexico study, for example, illustrates that divergent results can be
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Qualitative standards may also be difficult to determine because
professional judgment involves applying conflicting values based on
complex, shifting, and unpredictable situations. Mark Nadel, Associ-
ate Director of the GAO's Income Security Issues, Health Education,
and Human Services Division, observed:
[S] etting clear goals and measuring performance can be dif-
ficult. For example, programs may face competing or con-
flicting goals. In child welfare, program managers and
workers must reconcile the competing goals of ensuring the
safety of a child, which may argue for removing a child from
his or her home, with the goal of preserving the family. As a
result, measuring success may be difficult in some cases.89
Furthermore, a decision must be made as to whether quality
should be measured based on inputs or outputs. Inputs would in-
clude factors such as numbers of service providers, visits, or equip-
ment. Outputs would examine results, such as health maintenance or
improvement, or educational attainment.
It may be argued that public services have functioned without
such detailed criteria and that, therefore, a private provider should be
able to do so as well. However, a private provider may not have a clear
stake in the service's success, but rather may be more interested in its
stock's success and in projecting an appearance of success by enrich-
ing the company's shareholders.9"
These difficulties do not mean that quality benchmarks should
not be set. While it may be impossible to set perfect standards, it
clearly would be an abdication of responsibility to set none and thus
make compliance oversight impossible. The proper approach would
be to set quality benchmarks to the best degree that is humanly possi-
ble. If qualitative benchmarks cannot be set, then it will be impossible
to monitor contract compliance. In that case, privatization should
most likely not take place. Indeed, some government agencies have
decided not to subcontract certain services precisely because it was too
difficult to define and measure performance and then to express
those standards in a contract.91
reached by using one data source (e.g., inmate surveys) versus another source (e.g., staff
surveys).").
89. Social Services Privatization, supra note 1, at 40 (footnote omitted) (prepared state-
ment of Mark Nadel).
90. See RJCHARDS ET AL., supra note 37, at 76-77 (noting, in the context of school priva-
tization, that private companies may be more concerned with the value of their stock than
with the type of education they are providing).
91. Cf LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 26, at 17 (reporting that "[o]fficials at all of the
governments we visited said that one of the most important-and often most difficult-
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Once qualitative standards are set, bidders must be required to
demonstrate that they could meet or exceed these standards. Na-
tional Association of Government Employees Legislative Director
Christopher M. Donnellan told a congressional panel:
Contractors are able to present the agency with a seductive
package of cost reductions by reducing the level of services.
Inadequate investigations of the statement of work by the
agency allows the contractor to achieve this result. In the
interwoven environment of a federal installation, any reduc-
tion in support or related services will have a domino effect
on the agency's capacity to perform. 2
Guarantees, not mere assurances, must be required. Documenta-
tion, rather than mere statements of good will, is necessary to prevent
low-ball bids;93 it is also necessary to guard against the possibility of
awarding contracts to those unable to perform the work-either be-
cause they lack expertise or because they have submitted such low bids
that they will lack the means to operate.94 This means bidders need to
provide sufficient detail as to their sources of financing, to explain
how they plan to meet the requirements, and to back up their predic-
tions with objective evidence indicating that they, in fact, could meet
those requirements. Evidence must include the bidder's track record
in performing similar work and in complying with government regula-
tions.95 Indeed, states should be proactive by sharing information as
tasks in privatizing government activities was writing specific work statements for the privat-
ization contract," and that "Georgia and Virginia's guidance for evaluating whether a ser-
vice should be considered for privatization focused on the ease with which the service's
objectives could be defined and measured for monitoring purposes").
92. Contracting Out-Successes and Failures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Civil Service
of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong., at 22 (1997) (statement of
Christopher M. Donnellan, Legislative Director, National Association of Government
Employees).
93. Cf COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-50-503(1) (a) (West Supp. 2000) (requiring privat-
ization contracts to be conditioned upon "[t]he contracting agency clearly demon-
strat[ing] that the proposed contract will result in overall cost savings to the state and that
the estimated savings will not be eliminated by contractor rate increases during the term of
the contract"). Initial bidding on privatized Denver buslines involved low-ball bids, which
quickly doubled. See ScLAR, supra note 1, at 86.
94. See, e.g., SCLAR, supra note 1, at 88 n.14 (noting that a Denver firm was forced to
give up its contract 90 days after it began because it was unable to secure workers at the low
wages necessary to meet its contract price).
95. Track record information would have proved valuable to states that contracted with
Wackenhut, a private firm that received contracts to run prisons despite having compiled a
troubled record at other facilities. Ken Kolker, Changes Ahead for Troubled Prison, GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS, May 20, 2000, at http://gr.mlive.com/news/index.ssp./news/stories/
20000520gwackenhu02l802.frm; see also infra notes 103-104 (discussing the Wackenhut fa-
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to price, performance, and vendor qualifications to ensure competi-
tive prices and to guard against subcontracting to poor performers.96
Massachusetts is a model in this area. It requires the head of the
agency proposing privatization and the commissioner of administra-
tion to certify in writing to the state auditor: (1) that the quality of the
services to be provided by the bidder is likely both to satisfy the estab-
lished quality requirements and "to equal or exceed the quality of ser-
vices which could be provided by regular agency employees" in the
most cost efficient manner;9 7 (2) that the contract cost will be less
than the estimated cost based on best practice;98 (3) that the contract
takes into account compliance with all relevant statutes "concerning
labor relations, occupational safety and health, nondiscrimination
and affirmative action, environmental protection and conflicts of in-
terest";99 and (4) that the proposed contract is in the public inter-
est. 100 The state auditor then may call witnesses to be examined
under oath and for the production of records as part of his investiga-
tion into whether a service should be privatized.10 l
Essential information in determining whether subcontracting is
appropriate includes details as to the number of workers who will be
performing the work. This is the only way to ensure that the bidder is
not low-balling the bid and can actually perform the work. Experi-
ence has shown that assurances as to staffing levels cannot be left un-
questioned on the assumption that the subcontractor will be
disciplined by the market.10 2 The market is more likely to discipline
the public, who will risk losing vital services if the subcontractor can-
cility and its problems). Such a track record should signal trouble ahead, not a green light
for future contracts.
96. Geraldine Jensen's comments make the need for such information sharing even
more apparent: "We are concerned not only about the poor collection performances but
with the apparent price gouging. Lockheed Martin IMS is receiving seven times as much
money in Maryland as Virginia for doing exactly the same type of work. Who is responsible
for monitoring contracts states have with private vendors?" Social Services Privatization, supra
note 1, at 144 (statement of Geraldine Jensen, President, Association for Children for En-
forcement of Support, Inc.).
97. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, § 54(7) (ii) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
98. Id. § 54(7) (iii).
99. Id. § 54(7) (iv).
100. Id. § 54(7) (v).
101. Id. § 55(b).
102. When asked about including this information, OMB's acting director for manage-
ment, G. Edward DeSeve, responded that it was too expensive to collect this information
and that there was no need to. Hanna, supra note 41, at D-20. He said that he was not
willing to "'assume that the competitive process required under the cu.rrent federal acqui-
sition regulations is insufficient to establish appropriate prices and quality levels."' Id.
(quoting G. Edward DeSeve).
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not perform. In other circumstances, the contractor may provide
poor services, but this may go undetected if the client population is
incompetent or is a despised or powerless group. If information
nonetheless leaks out, the state will be in the unpleasant situation of
being forced to decide whether it should terminate the contract and
step in and whether it has the ability to resume operation quickly. For
example, Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, a private Florida
prison management company that ran a Michigan youth prison, was
forced to provide more training for guards and to recruit additional
employees after a local Michigan newspaper reported dangerous con-
ditions in the youth correctional facility.1'" The state was forced to
route youth offenders to other facilities until the problems were re-
solved.1"4 Similarly, when Educational Alternatives, Inc. (EAI), a pro-
vider of private educational services, was unable to meet educational
qualitative criteria, the city of Baltimore was forced to decide among
difficult courses of action, including bailing out the school system with
public money to prevent its collapse. 105
Just as establishing uniform and reliable standards and proce-
dures for cost accounting can ensure good decisionmaking and can
avoid reinventing processes (and risk omitting necessary considera-
tions) for each bid decision, so too should uniform standards be set
for ascertaining desired levels of service. To the extent possible, these
guaranteed levels of service should specify objective, measurable stan-
dards, as well as consequences for failing to achieve them. When a
subcontractor can determine the level of services it is to provide and is
required to pay for additional services that it finds necessary, it is given
an incentive to find those additional services unnecessary. 10 6 Con-
tracts with performance criteria linked to rewards and penalties pro-
103. Kolker, supra note 95.
104. Ken Kolker, Inmates Shifted to Meet State Law, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, May 19, 2000, at
Al. One additional problem with the prison was that the facility was housing inmates older
than seventeen, in violation of state law. Id. However, Michigan's contract with Wacken-
hut guaranteed an occupancy level that was apparently difficult to meet with available of-
fenders below that age. See Kolker, supra note 95 ("State law allows the prison system to
house inmates there only if they were 16 and under when they committed their crime. But
the State also was sending prisoners there who broke the law at age 17 or older. The 450-
bed prison had housed 330 inmates age 19 and under.").
105. Jean Thompson et al., Cutoff of EAl Saves Little; Scrapped Contract Does Not Resolve
Schools' Money Crisis, BALT. SUN, Nov. 23, 1995, at IA. See generally Rick Green, EAI Rebounds
with a New Name, HARTroRD CouRANT, Dec. 18, 1997, at A16 (discussing EAI's attempts to
improve business after being "crushed by high-profile failures in Hartford and Baltimore");
Gregory Palast, Profit and Education Don't Mix: Britain Should Learn a Lesson from the US,
OBSERVER (London), Mar. 26, 2000, at 7 (discussing EAI's background and failures in the
United States).
106. Putnam, supra note 48.
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vide an incentive for the contractor to do a good job1°7 and also guard
against possible claims by a contractor that it misunderstood what it
agreed to.
Some laws do require a subcontractor to demonstrate that it can
guarantee specified savings and higher levels of quality. For example,
the District of Columbia requires a guarantee of a five percent sav-
ings. 08 Florida requires that before privatizing a prison, it must deter-
mine that subcontracting will save at least seven percent.1 0 9 Arizona
does not set a benchmark level, but instead requires the office in
charge of privatization to "develop minimum savings criteria for gov-
erning the award of contracts resulting from the competitive govern-
ment process." 110
Mandating specific savings and requiring the subcontractor to
demonstrate its ability to achieve them and to establish the means by
which it plans to do so are prudent and reasonable requirements.
Subcontracting comes with a cost in terms of upheaval, risk, and un-
foreseen consequences. Therefore, there should be a good reason to
do it-demonstrably lower cost and guaranteed better service-unless
a legislature has decided that privatization must take place for purely
ideological reasons, without regard for the public welfare. The factors
to be considered in subcontracting are complex and cannot fully be
reduced to objective criteria; thus, even under the best of circum-
stances, relevant factors may be overlooked. Mandating a margin of
demonstrated improvement is a way of taking these problems into ac-
count and is, in reality, a way of ensuring that the private service is not
worse and that costs are not higher than before subcontracting. Oth-
erwise, what appear to be cost savings in a bid may turn out to be cost
overruns in reality.
It is unthinkable that any subcontracting legislation would fail to
provide objective guidelines and standards. How else could adminis-
trators make responsible and wise decisions and ensure that the pub-
lic receives the services it demands and needs at reasonable cost?
D. Accounting for Public Property
Public assets can take many forms, including structures, build-
ings, machinery, systems, land, water rights, easements and rights-of-
way, improvements, utilities, landscaping, sidewalks, roads, curbs and
107. See RIcHARDS ET AL., supra note 37, at 145 (noting that if contracts do not contain
performance criteria, "there is less incentive for the contractor to do a good job").
108. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1181.5b(a)(2) (1999 & Supp. 2000).
109. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 957.07 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001).
110. Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-2773(5) (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
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gutters, equipment, furnishings, information, paying clientele, money,
and employee knowledge and skills. It will increasingly take the form
of intangible property.
Property connected with privatization not only may take many
forms, but it also can be affected in many ways. In some cases, subcon-
tractors have been given or lent public materials-equipment, build-
ings, or money-either directly or in the form of subsidies.'11  Other
subcontractors may acquire, improve, or control public assets. Each
of these situations creates its own problems. Some subsidies to sub-
contractors are direct and obvious," 2 but subsidies can take many, less
obvious forms. Allowing a contractor to have or use public property
acts as a subsidy to the sub-contractor and means that the contractor
has not submitted a competitive bid unless the subsidy is taken into
account. Entrusting assets to a subcontractor may mean that the gov-
ernment has left itself unable to reclaim the services when there is
evidence of nonperformance or unsatisfactory performance. There-
fore, if the subcontract involves the subcontractor's building or ac-
quiring property to perform a service, there needs to be a means of
returning that property to the public at a fair price based on the con-
tract expectations.
However property comes into a contractor's hands, prudence de-
mands that public assets be protected. Good practice would require
accounting for such property at many points in the process. Public
items must be included in cost accounting and protected from injury
or waste during the contract term. They must also be returned to the
public in a condition that does not diminish their value at fair cost at
the end of the contract or upon default or breach. Otherwise, if no
provision for their return is made, a contractor may appropriate, sell,
transform, or waste assets." 3
111. See, e.g., ELLIOTT D. SCLAR ET AL., ECON. POL'Y INST., THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES:
TRANSIT PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 26-27 (1989) (noting that the only savings to
Louisiana taxpayers from a New Orleans privatization effort "come[ I at [a] higher cost to
U.S. taxpayers, who end up footing the bill for the [Urban Mass Transit Association] grants
that subsidize the project and make it appear as a 'savings"').
112. For example, New Orleans would have incurred more than $526,000 in additional
annual costs in its contract to operate certain bus routes had the federal government not
awarded a grant to subsidize $1,467,000 each year. See ScLAR ET AL., supra note 111, at 26 &
tbl.2 (illustrating the increased cost of privatization of several New Orleans bus routes by
showing additional costs of contracting services).
113. In a privatization experiment, Greyhound Lines, Inc. operated buses owned by the
Metro-Dade Transit Agency of Miami, Florida. ScLAR, supra note 1, at 114-15. After only
eighteen months of service, the experiment was cancelled. Id. at 115. However, only ten of
the forty new buses operated by Greyhound could be put back in service because they had
been so poorly maintained. Id.
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Before any public assets are entrusted to a subcontractor, they
need to be identified, assessed, and properly valued. Montana, for
example, requires a listing of all public assets and their intended dis-
position under a privatization plan.114 Depending on the sort of asset,
valuation may either be simple or very complex. Many public assets
are unique, and this may be true even of buildings. Thus, there may
be no comparable properties to use in setting fair market value. Some
public assets currently generate revenues or may be privatized in or-
der to generate revenues."' Privatizing a revenue-generating asset
could mean depriving the public of income; in some cases, those reve-
nues mean an asset has greater value to the public if it remains in the
public sector.
If managing a public asset requires or entails some investment by
the subcontractor, the contract must state how those investments will
be treated at the contract's end. Depending on the circumstances,
the investment could be removed by the contractor or could remain
with the asset and be returned to the public (and potentially to a later
contractor). If the latter occurs, there must be some consideration as
to whether the government must reimburse the contractor for the in-
vestments and, if so, how to value them. All investments will be paid
for with public funds, but in some cases they might be treated more
appropriately as the government's investment, and in other cases as
the contractor's investment. In some cases, investments may re-
present real value added, while in others they may be useful to the
contractor but to no one else. Sometimes, improvements or invest-
ments cannot easily be separated from the asset. Certainly, parties will
act differently during the term of the contract depending on how as-
sets will be treated at its end. Failing to consider and agree upon how
these assets and investments will be treated at the contract's end en-
sures a complex and costly dispute, whose costs may mean losing any-
thing gained from privatization.
A state considering privatization should also decide whether and
how to tax the assets and operations of the subcontractor. A failure to
114. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-8-303(1)(d) (1999); cf UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-95-
402(1)(a)(ii), (b)(ii) (Supp. 2000) (providing that prior to privatizing a governmental
function, the entity seeking privatization must submit recommended legislation that "ad-
dress[es] the value of any interests the state holds in the quasi-governmental entity and
whether the state should receive compensation for those interests as part of privatization"
and that the privatization plan must be audited "to determine the amount, nature, and
source of revenues and assets of the quasi-governmental entity").
115. See, e.g., STARR, supra note 33, at 15-16 (discussing the possibility of privatizing the
Postal Service and identifying the potential benefits of privatizing public housing).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tax when private property or businesses normally would be taxed is a
hidden subsidy to a private business. 116
If the contractor invests in the asset, there should be a decision as
to whether the government will lend money to the contractor (and, if
so, at what rate) or will assist the contractor in achieving favorable
rates."1 7 If the contractor is allowed to charge the public in connec-
tion with the use of the asset, what use will be made of the money
collected, and who will be entitled to what portion of it? In addition,
will the contractor be able to set the rates unilaterally, or will the rates
be controlled, approved, or set by the government? If the govern-
ment pays a service fee to the contractor or becomes obligated finan-
cially in other ways as a result of the contract, how will that fee or
other money be paid? By a bond, taxes, or otherwise?118 All of these
questions must be addressed in advance of a privatization decision.
Assets that may be entrusted to the subcontractor include not
only tangible items, such as buildings and equipment, but also fees or
other money that the subcontractor collects and is supposed to for-
ward to the public treasury. Money is fungible and easily misappropri-
ated. Californians learned this lesson the hard way when, in 1997, a
contractor left the state park reservation system in shambles when it
absconded with $1 million of public money.1l 9 This was a disaster for
a state that depends on tourism; California was left with the decision
to either track down the money, to recoup it, or to write it off as a loss.
When the assets the subcontractor will acquire also include infor-
mation, even more difficult problems arise. The government collects
and maintains detailed, personal, and confidential information. 120
Considering the sensitive nature of much of the information that gov-
ernment agencies collect, it seems unlikely that the public would want
it marketed to increase a subcontractor's profits. But contractors may
116. Cf KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-5509 (1991) (requiring private contractors to pay taxes on
the revenue producing portion of a privatized facility).
117. Cf id. § 12-5503(a) (3) (noting that a municipality that enters into a service agree-
ment may "either pledge its full faith and credit or obligate a specific source of payment
for the payment of the service fee").
118. Cf id. § 12-5505 (authorizing a municipality to "levy property taxes, impose fees
and charges, levy special assessments, [and] exercise any other revenue producing author-
ity" for the payment of a service fee).
119. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text (further discussing the failure of the
privatized California state park reservation system).
120. For example, government agencies keep detailed reports of income and its sources,
data on mental and physical health, and contacts with government agencies and informa-
tion on the purpose of those contacts-including library materials checked out, police
contacts short of arrest and conviction, HIV status and dates of testing, and queries to
public agencies.
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feel tempted to use information as the valuable resource it is by selling
or renting it. Information, as with other sorts of property that have
been paid for by tax dollars, should not just be given away to subcon-
tractors. As with other assets, a decision must be made as to the own-
ership of information at the contract's end. 121
While it is easy to know if a tangible asset, such as a building or
vehicle, has been returned, ensuring the return of information, espe-
cially electronic information, is more complex. When it is in elec-
tronic form-and with each passing day it is more likely that
information will be in this form-information can be easily trans-
ferred and even broadcast. Unlike most forms of property, informa-
tion can be both returned to the government and retained by the
contractor. Thus, it is not sufficient only to demand its return at the
contract's end; the subcontractor must also be required to divest itself
of all copies.
Finally, government may decide it must retain the public's physi-
cal property and human capital so it can respond quickly to a crisis.
For example, it is easy to see that government may need to keep
reserves of oil, because it is in the national interest to protect the pub-
lic from price and supply shocks.
But more than this, contracting out can "diminish[ ] govern-
ment's expertise in key areas, and reduce[ ] its ability to address fu-
ture problems."' 22 Maintaining in-house expertise also helps set
competitive prices, particularly when there is no market; it can be
used to test whether a private company can beat the government's
price. Richard Boris, the Virginia Private Prison Administrator,
observed:
If you privatized everything, you would have within about 10
years no expertise left within your department of corrections
because they hadn't been running. You learn about running
prisons by running prisons....
If you ever had to take over a facility-now, this is ajail down
in Texas, but I think it's Brazzio (ph) or whatever where we
121. If, for example, a private company contracts to publish statutes and judicial deci-
sions and then claims it owns copyright in the material, the government may find itself
embroiled in litigation to establish its ownership rights. Cf Julius J. Marke, Legal Compila-
tions and the Public Domain, N.Y.L.J., May 19, 1992, at 4, 4 (discussing the debate over
whether certain legal compilations of materials belonging to the public domain may be
afforded copyright protection); Richard C. Reuben, A Recipe for Merger: Thomson and West
Agree to Change an Antitrust Agreement in Response to Competitors' Criticisms, A.B.A. J., Dec.
1996, at 28, 28 (discussing the licensing agreement between West Publishing Co. and its
competitors for use of West's copyrighted page numbering system).
122. Hanna, supra note 41, at D20.
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heard about the inmates from Missouri being beaten and
there were videotapes shown on TV nationwide and all-
where would you get correctional officers to move in quickly
if you weren't running some of your own? 123
It can be just as important for government to have ready access to
expertise-and even to develop and foster expertise-that has no use
in the private market or that might even be seen as leading to an
inefficient market. For example, a democratic government has a spe-
cial obligation to serve underserved populations and even to protect
them from market forces. The poor and disenfranchised are certain
to be losers with privatization because they lack the money and power
to have an impact on the market. A private market might find it ad-
vantageous not to provide services to these populations. Related to
this, Jocelyn Frye, of the Women's Legal Defense Fund, argues that
"certain tasks, such as setting eligibility requirements, are not appro-
priate functions for the private sector.1 24
These miscellaneous services and means of providing them can
be seen as assets or forms of property that democratic government-a
government of, by, and for the people-needs to retain in order to
perform its full range of functions.
E. Worker Protections and Regulations
Government as employer has always played an important role in
modeling employer behavior by providing disadvantaged groups se-
cure jobs at good pay and by making it possible for them to do work
vital to the social fabric of this country. The impact of this role goes
far beyond the pay packet of an individual worker who might not oth-
erwise have had ajob or as good ajob, received a living wage, or been
able to play an important role in promoting public policy. This ar-
rangement has also helped secure a more equitable distribution of
government services to all members of the community.' 25 Workers
who receive pay sufficient to support a family will pay taxes, will not
require government services, and will raise children in the sort of envi-
ronment more likely to lead them to be contributing members of soci-
123. Morning Edition: Tennessee Private Prisons Debate (NPR radio broadcast, Nov. 13,
1997) (statement of Richard Boris).
124. Kurt Fernandez et al., Welfare: Labor Cheers, Texas Jeers HHS Decision Limiting Privat-
ization of Texas Welfare Plan, 1997 DAMLV LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 88, at D9 (May 7, 1997)
(quoting Jocelyn Frye).
125. Cf SEIU LOCAL 660 RESEARCH DEP'T, THE PUBLIC COST OF PRIVATE CONTRACTING: A
REVIEW OF Los ANGELES COUNTY PROPOSITION A "PRIVATIZATION" PROGRAM ii (April 1991)
(stating that over 80% of civil service jobs contracted out were held by black and Latino
employees, but that, once contracted, the jobs paid $300-400 less per month).
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ety. Minority workers may have greater understanding of, or
sensitivity to, their communities' needs and may literally be able to
talk the language of disadvantaged parts of the community. They
help make government for and of the people.
An overly zealous cost cutter in the private sector might not see
this larger picture and might focus only on costs directly under its
control, ignoring those that can be shifted to other parts of the gov-
ernment. Costs may be lowered and profits generated by cutting
wages, lowering benefits, using more part time workers, or eliminating
health insurance, 126 but is this desirable? To the extent decisions
about subcontracting ignore factors other than the discrete cost of a
job, they may end up being more costly to the government as a whole.
If, for example, a contractor cuts costs by eliminating health insur-
ance, government on some level is likely to have to pick up those
costs-either through subsidizing public hospitals, through welfare
payments, through paying an increased cost of care for persons who
delayed seeking treatment and were made more seriously ill, through
increased levels of disease in the population, or through other sorts of
remediation made necessary by a lack of adequate health care.
The standard set by government as employer should continue to
be the standard, even when the private employer is delivering a public
service. Indeed, it is in the government's and the public's self-interest
that this be the case. Colorado includes this as part of the policy be-
hind its privatization statute, 1 2 7 and reinforces the policy by providing
that, in comparing costs, any savings attributable to lower health insur-
ance benefits provided by the contractor shall not be included. 128
Paying good wages is more than charity. It may also promote
high quality public services. Wage levels may affect and reflect the
quality of worker an employer can attract. While taxpayers might ini-
tially be pleased to get value for their money, in the sense of getting
the service at a lower wage cost, employees willing to work for lower
wages may not provide the value that more highly paid workers would.
Low-waged work is the sort of work most prone to frequent turno-
126. In its 1984 study of privatization in the Los Angeles area, HUD found that private
contractors' lower costs were explained in part by greater use of part time workers who
were paid no benefits, received shorter vacations, and were less experienced, lower-skilled,
and non-unionized. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., DELIVERING MUNICIPAL SERVICES
EFFICIENTLY- A COMPARISON OF MUNICIPAL AND PRIVATE SERVICE DELIVERY, 16-17, 25, 27, 39,
41-42 (June 1984); see also Wessel, supra note 1, at 45 (noting that localities favor con-
tracting out "to avoid paying high public sector wages").
127. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-50-501 (West Supp. 2000).
128. Id. § 24-50-503(1) (a) (IV).
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ver,1 29 but many public services need long term workers with historical
knowledge of clients, methods, and services. 130
Several states with privatization statutes have attempted to address
these concerns. Massachusetts, for example, requires that every con-
tract must contain a statement that the subcontractor will comply with
antidiscrimination laws and will take affirmative steps to comply with
equal employment opportunity.' A bidder must provide detailed in-
formation as to the wages it proposes to pay for each job.1 12 Montana
requires that any privatization plan include a list of all workers em-
ployed in a program and "the estimated effect of the proposed privat-
ization on their employment status."' 3 3 This requirement is a way of
ensuring that comparable services are being considered. For exam-
ple, if a subcontractor were to offer a bid based on an average wage,
that wage might be based on lower-paid job classifications than those
of persons who would actually be capable of doing that sort of work.
To remain within the contract price, the employer would have to raise
the offered wages, but then could not afford enough workers to pro-
vide a comparable level of service. By requiring this information, the
government is able to determine whether a service is likely to be pro-
vided at the contract price only by relying on unqualified workers or
too few workers to deliver the service.
Some might argue that cutting wages is permissible as an exercise
of the market. That is, if an employer can attract workers at lower
wages, then that is the appropriate wage and any other is a waste of
assets. However, if a contractor is allowed to withhold the provision of
health insurance for its employees, and taxpayers have to subsidize the
contractor's profits by bearing the cost of health care for uninsured
workers, this means that taxpayers are subsidizing an uncompetitive
private sector employer. To avoid subsidizing the employer and to
ensure that privatization is competitive, the cost of the subsidy would
have to be included in the bid, so it accounts for all costs of con-
tracting and is fully comparable with public sector costs. Making such
an assessment, however, would be very difficult. It is simpler to merely
require that comparable working conditions continue, and thus that
no subsidy is needed.
129. See SCLAR ET AL., supra note 111, at 29-30 (noting a correlation between wage level
and rate of absenteeism and job turnover).
130. See, e.g., SCLAR, supra note 1, at 110 (referring to paratransit services where taxi
companies and school-bus operators were well-suited for providing the services because
they had experience providing door-to-door service, "a hallmark of paratransit").
131. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, § 54(3) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
132. Id. § 54(2).
133. Mou-rr. CODE ANN. § 2-8-303(1)(c) (1999).
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Legislatures also need to consider whether they will permit sub-
contractors to terminate and replace current workers. Allowing this
raises a number of complex issues, including obligations owed to pub-
lic employees and the need to ensure continuity of services. States
that have addressed this issue have taken different approaches. Colo-
rado forbids contracts that allow the termination of certified state em-
ployees from service as part of privatization.13 4 Massachusetts requires
the contractor to offer employment to qualified public employees who
are displaced by subcontracting." 5 The District of Columbia provides
that any subcontractor who displaces government employees must of-
fer the employees a "right-of-first-refusal to employment by the con-
tractor, in a comparable available position for which the employee is
qualified, for at least a 6-month period during which the employee
shall not be discharged without cause. '' a31 If the employee's perform-
ance during the six-month transition is satisfactory, the new contrac-
tor must offer the employee continued employment under the
contractor's terms and conditions.'" 7 In addition, employees who are
to be displaced must be given at least thirty days notice."' Montana
requires that notice be given to an employee and the employee's col-
lective bargaining unit "as soon as possible prior to privatization." '139
When more than twenty-five employees are affected, notice must be
given at least sixty days prior to the privatization;1 40 when fewer than
twenty-five employees are affected, notice must be given at least four-
teen days before privatization.14 1 Arkansas requires agencies that in-
tend to lay off employees as a result of privatization to report those
impending layoffs to the Legislative Council and the Office of Person-
nel Management of the Department of Finance and Administra-
tion.1 42 The report must include details about the number and grade
of employees to be laid off and about how the decision to lay off was
134. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-50-503(2) (West Supp. 2000); cf id. § 24-50-504 (setting
out criteria explaining when the use of independent contractors by private contractors is
permissible).
135. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, § 54(3).
136. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1181.5b(a)(3) (Supp. 2000).
137. Id. § 1-1181.5b(a) (5). Florida provides that as part ofa privatization project, public
workers may be leased to the contractor. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 288.901(2) (West 1996 & Supp.
2000). Those employees retain their "state employee status" and their right to take part in
the public employees retirement system. Id,
138. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1181.5b(a) (8).
139. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-18-1206(1) (1999).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 2-18-1206(2); cf NJ. STAT. ANN. § 30:1-7.4 (West Supp. 2000) (requiring that
no decision be made by the Commissioner of Human Services to privatize any services if
such a decision would abolish "100 or more non-vacant, full-time positions").
142. 1999 Ark. Acts 17, § 2.
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made. 143 Those positions are then removed from the agency's budget
for the next two years.
1 44
Many public sector workers are represented by unions; their right
to join a union is protected by law in most states and is sanctioned by
federal law and policy. 145 It is inappropriate for government to enter
into a subcontracting arrangement that subverts workers' legal rights
and deunionizes the workplace. Therefore, state legislatures should
provide for the continuation of union representation of those workers
if they are employed by a subcontractor. In fact, the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) achieves just this result under the successorship
doctrine. 
46
There are many terms of employment in addition to wages,
hours, and benefits that are set by regulations or public sector rules.
A determination needs to be made whether and how these will apply
to the private contract. Furthermore, if such terms do not apply to
the contract, is there any reason why they should apply to the work
when done in the public sector? Is there a reason to free a private
contractor from regulations that might impede doing the work more
efficiently in the public sector?
Not only do regulations protect public sector workers, they also
impose special requirements on them. Residency requirements are
an example. One concern that might arise as a result of subcontract-
ing is how to ensure that a subcontractor-particularly if it is an out-
of-town corporation-is responsive to the community's needs and
concerns. Traditionally, city governments have tried to ensure this by
imposing residency requirements on public employees. 14 7 When a
143. Id.
144. Id. § 3.
145. See HARRY T. EDWARDS ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: CASES
AND MATERIALS 8 (4th ed. 1985) (remarking that only ten states have not adopted public-
sector bargaining laws).
146. See Lincoln Park Zoological Soc'y v. NLRB, 116 F.3d 216, 218, 219 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the successorship doctrine, which states that a new employer that hires a
majority of its employees from its predecessor activates the bargaining obligation of the
NLRA, is consistent with the NLRA when majority status is attributed to a union that has
been voluntarily recognized by the predecessor employer).
147. These residency requirements have become the subject of litigation. See, e.g.,
United Bldg. Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984) (holding
that a municipal ordinance requiring that at least forty percent of employees of contractors
working on city construction projects be Camden residents was not unconstitutional);
White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (holding that the
Mayor of Boston's executive order requiring that at least half of the workers on all city
construction projects be residents of Boston was not unconstitutional); McCarthy v. Phila-
delphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (holding that a Philadelphia regulation
requiring that city employees be residents of Philadelphia was not unconstitutional).
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service is privatized, the need to bind the contractor to the commu-
nity still exists. Consideration should be given to whether the contract
should impose residency requirements, and, if so, whether the re-
quirements should also apply to all or a percentage of officers and
stockholders in the private company.14 8
In short, in subcontracting it is important to consider the role
and purpose of regulations affecting the employment conditions of
public workers. The public should not allow these important require-
ments to be subverted so that they subsidize uncompetitive employers.
These ends can be promoted by requiring that contractors be bound
by the same laws as government agencies, such as providing a nondis-
criminatory workplace, fair working conditions, and the continuation
of these conditions into the private sector. To ensure that these re-
quirements are met, government may require that bonds be posted,
may provide incentives for meeting and exceeding certain
benchmarks, and may assess penalties for failure to meet stated
requirements.
III. PROCEDURAL CRITERIA
The need to have a special procedure for making decisions about
contracting out government services may not be obvious. After all,
government at all levels has long purchased private services and
goods.'4 9 However, there are important differences between the sorts
of contracting out done in the recent past and today. 5 ° Special inter-
est groups lobby vigorously in favor of contracting out government
services. There appears to be public support for it, and a wide range
of institutions are being considered for some degree of marketization.
Certainly, there is a qualitative difference between buying toilet
paper from the lowest bidder and providing health and disease con-
trol services. With the former, decisions are much simpler. Price is
likely to be the most important consideration, and it is easy to set qual-
ity criteria. With the latter, while no one would want waste or over-
spending, quality and continuity of the service will be far more
important, and the criteria to be considered will be much more com-
148. See Rudd, supra note 22 (asserting that "[a]ny city privatization proposal should
require officers and stockholders in the private company to abide by the same residency
requirements that city employees work under").
149. STARR, supra note 33, at 1.
150. But see Adler, supra note 35, at 1. Moshe Adler describes an earlier period in which
"contracting out was a mature system that was already as good as it could possibly be. And
it was precisely then that governmental production came to America. The realization that




plex. It is far easier to assess whether toilet paper meets specifications
and to find another supplier if problems with the contractor arise
than it is to make quality assessments when the service in question is
health and disease control. Furthermore, finding a substitute pro-
vider for disease control would be much more difficult, and the conse-
quences to public welfare more dire, if the subcontractor were to fail
to perform satisfactorily.
Establishing specialized procedures for each step of subcontract-
ing-from soliciting bids, to assessing bids, to oversight-becomes far
more important as requests to subcontract become more common,
the criteria more complex, and the consequences of mistakes more
serious. Only experienced, sophisticated, and qualified deci-
sionmakers using centralized, established processes can ensure that
these procedural needs are met and that accountability exists as well.
There are a number of necessary steps involved in deciding
whether to subcontract. How these steps are divided is a matter that
each governmental unit must decide based on its own needs. They
could be assigned to one entity-an entity given complete responsibil-
ity for subcontracting-or they could be subdivided among different
entities. In making that decision, a state would want to consider
whether its goals are more efficiently achieved by vesting responsibility
in one agency or by distributing them among more narrowly special-
ized bodies, whether oversight of the decisionmaking process is more
effective when carried out by one body or by separate agencies acting
as checks on one another, and whether quasi-legislative or quasi-exec-
utive roles are better kept separate or integrated. Finally, the entities
need to conform to the existing state governmental structures.
Alaska provides an example of a privatization body with a very
broad agenda. Its Commission on Privatization and Delivery of Gov-
ernment Services has an extensive, sophisticated, and flexible man-
date. That mandate requires the Commission to address how to most
appropriately deliver a service: to study existing services and deter-
mine whether they are more suitably delivered by federal or state gov-
ernment, the public or private sector, or consolidated public
agencies.1 5 ' To achieve these ends, the Commission is to review and
evaluate other states' policies and recommendations, to solicit public
151. 1999 Alaska Sess. Laws 61, § 5(a) (3); cf GA. CODE ANN. § 36-86-4 (2000) (defining a
procedure for assessing the efficiency of local government services and determining the
need for consolidation or privatization of such services); LESSONs LEARNED, supra note 26,
at 2 (noting that recent federal laws and initiatives have "direct[ed] federal managers to
review their programs by first considering whether government should be performing [a
given] activity").
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comment about contracting out, and to review Alaska's contracting
policies and procedures. 1 2 The Commission then identifies whether
state functions could be more efficiently and effectively provided by
transferring them to the private sector, local government, regional
service organizations, or the federal government; by retaining them at
the state level; by eliminating them; by agency consolidation or other
changes; or by a combination of these.' 53
The basic functions of such a privatization body include: (1) pro-
posing regulations; (2) identifying potential functions to subcontract;
(3) collecting information; (4) assisting an agency in instituting best
practices to establish a baseline; (5) drawing up bid specifications and
promoting competition by permitting public bids; (6) receiving bids;
(7) taking evidence and testimony relevant to the decision; (8) decid-
ing whether to subcontract and, if so, which bid to accept; (9) negoti-
ating the contract; (10) exercising oversight; (11) terminating
contracts; and (12) prosecuting breaches and other misfeasance. De-
tails of each of these procedural steps are discussed below, and a
range of options are canvassed. In many cases, there is no one best
way to achieve the goals of wise contracting. Rather, each state must
choose a process that suits its specific needs and goals.
A. Proposing Regulations
If detailed substantive guidelines are necessary, some body will
have to promulgate them. It might be that, after hearings, a legisla-
ture would enact highly detailed statutes spelling out those guidelines.
On the other hand, it is not unusual for a legislative body to enact
broad statutes, delegating the duty to be more specific. In other
words, the responsibility of providing details could be part of a privat-
ization agency's duty. This decision of which governmental entity will
provide the details will depend on the degree to which a legislature
desires to subject privatization regulations to more or less politicized
decisionmaking and whether there is a desire to delegate responsibil-
ity to an expert body. The decision as to whether delegation is even
appropriate will, of course, depend on each state's constitution and
administrative agency laws. Even if a given agency does not have the
power to regulate, it might provide useful expertise in advising the
legislature on future enactments.
Arizona, for example, charges its Office of Management and
Budget with designing standardized methodology for how the state
152. 1999 Alaska Sess. Laws 61, §§ 5(a)(1), 5(a)(6), 5(a)(2).
153. Id. § 5(a)(3).
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identifies and evaluates state functions to subcontract and with deter-
mining if future competitive contracting with the private sector and
other government agencies is in the best interest of the state. 154 Thus,
the Arizona legislature has ceded to this office not only the responsi-
bility of identifying which services will be privatized,' 55 but also the
responsibility of establishing privatization procedures and
guidelines.156
B. Identifying Potential Functions to Subcontract
Government agencies can take either an active or passive role in
initiating privatization. Agencies that take the active approach seek
out functions that might be provided more efficiently by the private
sector. On the other hand, an agency can play a relatively passive,
almost judicial role that would involve only weighing the decision
rather than seeking out functions that are ripe for privatization. If a
state takes an active role, then some agency must be charged with initi-
ating an evaluation of functions to be privatized.157 Arizona takes a
highly active role with a strong tilt toward promoting privatization. It
characterizes the performance of public services as "unfair competi-
tion," "' suggesting possible capture by a free market ideology. The
relevant statute declares: " [T] his state's fiduciary responsibility to tax-
payers [is to encourage] value in the provision and delivery of state
services by identifying and pursuing opportunities for increasing the
use of market forces in the delivery of state services, while preventing
unfair competition between state agencies and the private sector."159
In contrast, the Kansas performance review board-a body established
to review whether state government functions are being executed effi-
ciently-assumes a more passive role.16° The board initiates a study of
154. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2771(1), 41-2772(A)-(B) (West 1999).
155. Id. § 41-2772(A)-(B).
156. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2773 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000). The office also reviews
petitions forwarded to it by the private enterprise review board. Id. § 41-2773(6) (d).
157. See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 26, at 10-11 (noting that some state governments
have established support staffs, which typically use an analytical framework to evaluate the
performance of government activity and the potential risks and benefits of privatizing such
activity).
158. Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-2772(A) (West 1999).
159. Id.; see also ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-2773(1) (West 1999 & Supp. 2000) (charging
that the Office of Management and Budget "[s]hall develop, implement and manage a
statewide competitive government"). Utah takes a similar view. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-
55a-3(1) (b) (1997) (requiring that its Privatization Policy Board review "requests for privat-
ization of services and issues concerning agency competition with the private sector and
determine whether privatization would be feasible and would result in cost savings and
ways to eliminate any unfair competition").
160. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7101 (1997).
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the privatized government function and whether it should be or
should remain in the private sector only after it receives a request from
the public or from government employees. 6 '
Most other states that take an active role assume a less ideological
approach than does Arizona and instead focus on identifying poten-
tial functions to subcontract by using criteria based on cost and qual-
ity.162  For example, Mississippi's Joint Legislative Committee on
Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review analyzes all areas of
state government to identify programs and services that could be per-
formed by the private sector at lower cost or greater efficiency. 163 The
Committee is charged to consider options such as contracting out,
competitive bidding, and the sale of state assets. 16 4
Montana uses a two-way process. The state's legislative auditor is
charged with identifying subcontracted programs that could be ad-
ministered more cost-effectively directly by the agency, as well as
agency functions that could be more efficiently performed in the pri-
vate sector.' 6 5 In addition, "[m] embers of the public, elected bargain-
ing agents or employee representatives, elected officials, legislators,
and agency directors may submit to the legislative audit committee a
request to review programs being conducted under contract by an
agency that may be administered more cost-effectively directly by the
agency."''
66
161. The Kansas Board is to initiate an analysis of government function when it receives:
(1) A written suggestion or complaint regarding the opportunity to modify, elimi-
nate or delegate to the private sector a governmental function by a citizen of the
state including legislators and public employee organizations;
(2) a petition of private interest, wherein a private firm indicates both the interest
and capability of providing a service currently provided by state government;
(3) a private sector complaint of public sector competition, wherein a private firm
submits a written allegation that state government is providing or offering a prod-
uct or service that is available from the private sector and is in competition with
the private firm; or
(4) a written suggestion by a public employee or a public employee organization
regarding the opportunity to review a governmental function that has been dele-
gated to the private sector.
Id. § 75-7104(a)(1)-(4).
162. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-103-209(2) (2000) (requiring the state's Joint Legis-
lative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review to file a report "with
the objective of identifying programs and services that can be performed by the private
sector with lower cost or increased efficiency"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-8-303(1) (g) (1999)
(requiring that any privatization plan consider the estimated cost and quality differences
that would result from the plan's implementation).
163. MIss. CODE ANN. § 27-103-209(2).
164. Id.
165. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-8-304(1).
166. Id. § 2-8-304(2).
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The more active the agency is in seeking out functions to subcon-
tract, the better it is to have a separate agency decide whether to sub-
contract. An agency that both seeks out bids and decides whether to
subcontract has an inherent conflict of interest. It cannot credibly
decide whether to subcontract in instances in which it has initiated
the process for fear of actual or perceived lack of impartiality.
C. Collecting Information
Both as part of the process of initiating the decision to consider
functions for subcontracting, and as a step to be taken once that deci-
sion is made, a more in-depth analysis of the functions needs to be
made. This ties in with the earlier discussion on assessing qualitative
and cost criteria and is set out here as a multi-step process using Loui-
siana's statute for guidance.
Louisiana provides an example of the sorts of sources of informa-
tion to be sought. Its legislative auditor may:
(1) Evaluate the basic assumptions underlying any and all
state agencies and the programs and services provided by the
state to assist the legislature in identifying those that are vital
to the best interests of the people of the state of Louisiana
and those that no longer meet that goal.
(2) Evaluate the programs, policies, services, and activities
administered by the agencies of state government and iden-
tify overlapping functions, outmoded programs or methodol-
ogies, areas needing improvement, and/or programs
amenable to privatization.
(3) Evaluate the impact, effectiveness, and cost-effectiveness
of all state agencies and of their programs, services, and
activities.
(4) Evaluate the efficiency with which state agencies operate
the programs under their jurisdictions and fulfill their
duties.
(5) Evaluate methods agencies use to maximize the amount
of federal and private funds received by the state for its pro-
grams in order to ensure that the people of Louisiana re-
ceive a fair share of the taxes which they pay to the United
States government and to provide for the effective efficient
use of private resources.
(6) Evaluate the management of state debt.
(7) Evaluate the assessment, collection, and application of
user fees.
(8) Make recommendations each year relative to the pro-
grams and services the various state agencies provide as well
as recommendations for elimination of or reduction in fund-
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ing for agencies, programs, or services based on the results of
performance audits. Such recommendations shall be sub-
mitted in a report to each member of the legislature no later
than February fifteenth each year.
(9) Make annual recommendations to the appropriate over-
sight committees of the legislature and the Legislative Audit
Advisory Council as to amendments to statutory and constitu-
tional provisions that will improve the efficiency of state gov-
ernment, including, if appropriate, recommendations
concerning the reorganization or consolidation of state
agencies.
(10) Evaluate the methods used by each agency in the esti-
mation, calculation, and reporting of its performance, and
evaluate the actual outcomes of each agency's performance
with regard to its performance indicators . . . and provide
agencies with information relative to the methods used to
evaluate such performance. 167
The state auditor is to be assisted in this evaluation by state agencies
that are charged with developing measurable performance criteria, in-
cluding program goals and objectives.168
Other states might choose to emphasize other sources of informa-
tion to be considered at this preliminary step; this decision is highly
dependent on each state's needs and goals. However, Louisiana's ap-
proach provides a useful look at the range of information that can be
used.
D. Assisting an Agency in Instituting Best Practices to Establish
a Baseline
When Joni Mitchell observed, "You don't know what you've got
'til it's gone,"169 she was not advocating this as good practice. Privat-
ization should not be consummated until you know what you have-
what it costs and how it operates. Therefore, it cannot be known
whether contracting out will improve public services without first es-
tablishing a baseline understanding of the existing service. Such an
assessment needs to take place early in the process, before bids are
requested.
170
167. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24:522(C) (West Supp. 2000).
168. Id. § 24:522(D).
169. JoNI MITCHELL, Big Yellow Taxi, on LADIES OF THE CANYON (Reprise Records 1970).
170. Privatization advocates contend that privatization should take place even when gov-
ernment is performing optimally in order to benchmark government performance against
private firms. See Roger D. Feldman, Presentation to D.C. Privatization Task Force 4 (Apr.
25, 1995) (transcript on file with author).
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As discussed above, this quantitative, qualitative, and cost deter-
mination of the scope and nature of the service is not easy. It must
include computing all costs connected with providing the service, as-
sessing current workload and performance standards, and consider-
ing the target population and the service's role in the community.
Under the best circumstances, this process can have-and has had-
highly beneficial effects. 17' The process of self-analysis is essential
when determining how to reorganize in a way that provides the most
efficient and economical service. 172 An in-depth assessment will move
the agency toward the twin goals of improving service and saving
money.
Some might argue that this step is unnecessary, that an inefficient
service does not deserve a chance to lift its game, and that, in any case,
simply contracting out will bring market forces to bear and result in
improved service. Indeed, some state legislatures not only fail to re-
quire a reorganization process, they essentially forbid it by mandating
privatization. Arizona, for example, requires the administration of its
welfare reform program to be contracted out.' Only if no qualified
provider can be found or in the event of provider failure can the pro-
gram be run by the Department of Economic Security. 74
Such an inflexible mandate is not in the public interest. If a state
skips this important step of establishing a baseline understanding of
existing service, it will never know whether subcontracting saved any
money or provided better service, because there will be no compari-
son with the highest level achievable by the public sector.175 Any pri-
vate company that can outperform the best practice a public agency
can offer would then truly be an improvement and would lead to
savings.
171. Massachusetts provides a good example. See infra note 209 and accompanying text
(discussing the Massachusetts statute that allows the state to privatize services only after
providing written evidence that privatization will save money and improve the quality of
service).
172. See, e.g., ScLAR, supra note 1, at 71 (describing how a pre-privatization cost analysis
of the municipal pipe laying department in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, led to that depart-
ment's reorganization and a decision not to privatize, which saved the city millions of
dollars).
173. Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-300.01 (A) (West Supp. 2000) (stating that the Depart-
ment of Economic Security "shall" contract with a provider or providers of welfare to work
programs).
174. Id. § 46-300.01(D) (3)-(4).
175. Cf HEBDON, supra note 26, at 35-36, 37 (explaining the importance of quality assess-
ments and noting that in some cases, the outcome of such assessments might be skewed
because private companies might have more modern equipment at their disposal); id. at
57-60 (discussing specific cases of cost and quality assessments, some of which provide ex-
amples of how not to conduct such a study).
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The process of study and reorganization should not simply be left
to an individual agency; rather, it should be done under the guidance,
and with the assistance, of an expert body-in particular, a centralized
privatization body. Although the agency's management and employ-
ees will have valuable information about that agency's functions, they
will almost certainly need help in rethinking the organization. A body
with reorganization experience that adopts a facilitative approach can
perform a particularly valuable role. Such a body cannot perform a
reorganization, however, without the help of the public workers who
understand the nuances of theirjobs. Oklahoma, for example, recog-
nizes that current employees are essential to the reorganization pro-
cess. The state's privatization statute requires that before state services
can be privatized, "the agency must allow its employees the opportu-
nity to submit proposals" to improve its operations and efficiency.' 17 6
In other words, the best reorganization is a two-way process.
E. Drawing Up Bid Specifications and Promoting Competition by
Permitting Public Bids
Once a reorganization has taken place and cost, quantity, and
quality standards have been ascertained, the bid specifications can be
drawn up. Massachusetts provides:
The agency [proposing privatization] shall prepare a specific
written statement of the services proposed to be the subject
of the privatization contract, including the specific quantity
and standard of quality of the subject services. The agency
shall solicit competitive sealed bids for the privatization con-
tracts based upon this statement. The day designated by the
agency upon which it will accept these sealed bids shall be
the same for any and all parties. This statement shall be a
public record, shall be filed in the agency and in the execu-
tive office for administration and finance, and shall be trans-
177mitted to the state auditor for review ....
Although it should not be controversial, there are some who ar-
gue that public workers should not be allowed to bid on continuing to
perform their own work. They content that public workers have an
unfair advantage because they are familiar with the work and because
agencies, as governmental entities, are not required to pay taxes.' 78
176. OKa. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 589(A) (West Supp. 2001).
177. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 54(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
178. The Freedom from Government Competition Act, Senate Bill 314, introduced in
1997, and Senate Bill 1724, introduced in 1996, required that each agency obtain its goods
and services by procurement from "private sources." S. 314 § 3(a), 105th Cong. (1997); S.
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Gary D. Eugebretson, President of the Contract Services Association
of America, testified before the House Committee on Government
Reform:
For the private sector, the playing field is not, and likely
never will be, entirely level. This is primarily due to the fact
that, despite several recent laws, the government does not
have cost accounting systems in place to provide accurate or
reliable financial data on workloads, does not have to pay
taxes, and the methods by which it computes its overhead
rates are not comparable with those of industry, nor does the
government "pay" for infrastructure (e.g., buildings and
land). In addition, the government does not face, either
qualitatively or quantitatively, the same risks as a commercial
contractor (e.g., on issues relating to termination for default,
absorption of cost overruns or potential Civil False Claims
penalties) .179
The better reasoned view is that the public welfare depends on
public workers being allowed to bid. This is the only way to ensure
that the bidding is truly competitive and that taxpayers' interests are
protected. 8" If the market is the force that improves service, then it is
essential to ensure that a market exists. The optimum situation to
promote competition and better service cannot be subcontracting to
one bidder; wherever possible, an agency should subcontract to as
1724 § 3(a), 104th Cong. (1996). The Act thus virtually mandated contracting out and
outsourcing.
179. Prepared Testimony of Gary D. Eugebretson, President, Contract Servs. Ass'n of Am., Before
the House Comm. on Gov't Reform, Subcomm. on Gov't Mgmt., Info. & Tech., FED. NEWS SERV.
(Mar. 16, 2000).
180. See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 26, at 9, 14-15 (discussing local jurisdictions that
have benefited from competition between public employees and the private sector for the
rights to provide services). AFSCME Vice President Joe Flynn complains that, in fact,
much work that should be competitively bid under OMB Circular A-76 is privatized with no
competition:
Currently, most work is contracted out without public-private competition by
DoD [the Department of Defense]-the agency often held out as the champion
of OMB Circular A-76. Although DoD contracts out in excess of $60 billion annu-
ally, public employees have no chance of competing for almost all of that work
even with the Pentagon's increased reliance on the circular. For example, ac-
cording to an Army study, only 16,000 contractor jobs out of the service's entire
contractor workforce of 269,000 were competed through OMB Circular A-76.
Prepared Testimony ofJoe Flynn, Nat'l Vice President, 4th Dist., Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-
CIO, Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. on Defense, FED. NEWS SERV. (Mar. 29,
2000). OMB Circular A-76 establishes the federal government's policy regarding the priva-
tization of public services. See OMB Circular No. A-76 (revised), 48 Fed. Reg. 37,110 (Aug.
16, 1983).
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many bidders as possible."' s The reality, however, is that there may
not be many bidders. In many cases, the service may not be one that
is provided by private contractors. Allowing the current workers to
bid on their own work helps create the best semblance of a market in
this sort of situation. Certainly, excluding any legitimate bidder artifi-
cially restricts competition. Furthermore, excluding the workers who
have been providing the service stacks the deck and all but ensures
that the work will be contracted out, even if no one could do the work
better or at lower cost. It seems unlikely that most taxpayers would
favor contracting out a service at higher cost, but this may well happen
by barring the current workers from bidding. If competition is sup-
posed to ensure that services are provided in the most efficient way, it
makes no sense to exclude from bidding government workers or any
group which otherwise meets the substantive criteria.
There is one other way in which allowing public workers to bid
on their own work is essential to promoting the public interest. If
workers know that they are unable to bid and that the work will be
contracted out, they are unlikely to be willing participants in efforts to
rationalize and improve their agency's function. If public workers
know that they have a period of time in which to make their agency
operate as efficiently as possible and that if they do so they will retain
their work, then they have a strong incentive to put every effort into
the process. The beneficiary will be the public.
Many of the states that have subcontracting legislation do permit
public workers to bid on their work.182 The District of Columbia re-
quires that any solicitation for privatization contracts must include in-
formation concerning a procedure by which the current government
employees may bid on the contract.18 3 Massachusetts has a detailed
process:
181. In some states, however, the difference between promoting real competition as
opposed to transforming a public monopoly into a private monopoly appears to have been
overlooked. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-5508 (1991) (providing that a municipality con-
tracting out for the provision of public services may agree to vest the exclusive right to
provide the services in the private contractor). There is nothing about a monopoly that is
likely to involve competition, and thus it is unlikely that such a situation will yield the
improvements sought.
182. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1181.5b(a) (6) (Supp. 2000) ("Any solicitation for pro-
posed contracts... shall include information concerning the procedure by which current
[D.C.] government employees may exercise the right to bid on the contracts[.]"); MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, § 54(5) ("After consulting any relevant employee organization, the
agency [proposing privatization] shall provide adequate resources for the purpose of en-
couraging and assisting present agency employees to organize and submit a bid to provide
the subject services.").
183. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1181.5b(a) (6).
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(4) The agency [proposing privatization] shall prepare a
comprehensive written estimate of the costs of regular
agency employees' providing the subject services in the most
cost-efficient manner. The estimate shall include all direct
and indirect costs of regular agency employees' providing
the subject services, including but not limited to, pension,
insurance and other employee benefit costs. For the pur-
pose of this estimate, any employee organization may, at any
time before the final day for the agency to receive sealed
bids ... propose amendments to any relevant collective bar-
gaining agreement to which it is a party. Any such amend-
ments shall take effect only if necessary to reduce the cost
estimate pursuant to this paragraph below the contract
cost .... Such estimate shall remain confidential until after
the final day for the agency to receive sealed bids for the
privatization contract . . . at which time the estimate shall
become a public record, shall be filed in the agency and in
the executive office for administration and finance, and shall
be transmitted to the state auditor for review ....
(5) After consulting any relevant employee organization, the
agency shall provide adequate resources for the purpose of
encouraging and assisting present agency employees to or-
ganize and submit a bid to provide the subject services. In
determining what resources are adequate for this purpose,
the agency shall refer to an existing collective bargaining
agreement of a similar employee organization whose mem-
bers perform the subject services, if available, which agree-
ment provides similar resources in the same or other
agencies; provided, however, that if no such collective bar-
gaining agreement exists, the agency shall refer to any ex-
isting collective bargaining agreements providing such
resources, and shall provide such resources at the minimum
level of assistance provided in said agreements. The agency
shall consider any such employee bid on the same basis as all
other bids. An employee bid may be made as ajoint venture
with other persons." 4
This process provides a practical way to ensure that a private contrac-
tor receives a contract only as a result of demonstrating that it can
improve upon the public service.
184. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 54(4)-(5).
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F. Receiving Bids
Once bid specifications are released, an agent must be designated
to receive the bids and process them. Later steps are considered be-
low, but preliminary functions should include basic procedures, such
as checking that all bid requirements have been complied with and
preparing the bids for the decisionmaking process. This should in-
clude an initial investigation and factual assessment of the undertak-
ings set out in the bid. In other words, at some stage, a "background"
check must be performed as to objective information. The agency
can consider more contested information in later steps.
G. Taking Evidence and Testimony Relevant to the Decision; and
H. Deciding Whether to Subcontract and, If So, Which Bid to Accept.. 5
Decisions to contract out government services, when made
lightly, risk interrupting service and decreasing the quality of services.
Nevertheless, many legislatures stack the deck by limiting the informa-
tion to be sought or by allowing only certain information to come
before the decisionmaker.8 6 This is sometimes done by restricting
the composition of the decisionmaking body to less than all of the
interested parties, by limiting it only to privatization partisans, 187 or by
limiting those to be consulted.18 8 Such restrictions ensure that opti-
mum decisions cannot be made.
Legislatures should consider how open the process of making
subcontracting decisions should be. On the one hand, decisions
could all be made out of the public's sight; on the other, the process
could be an open one, complete with notice and an opportunity for
interested parties to be heard. Montana, for example, provides that
before privatizing a program, an agency is to prepare a privatization
plan that must "be released to the public and any affected employee
organizations. 1 8 9 The plan must also "be submitted to the legislative
audit committee at least 90 days prior to the proposed implementa-
tion date."19 No less than thirty days later, the legislative audit com-
185. Although different steps, these two share many common procedural concerns, and
thus it is more economical to consider them together.
186. See infra notes 193-194 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory require-
ments in Utah and Virginia that limit the source of information and decisionmaking pro-
cess to favor privatization).
187. See infra notes 203-205 and accompanying text (citing Arizona as an example of a
state achieving a pro-privatization bias by limiting the composition of the decisionmaking
body).
188. See infra note 205 (discussing Mississippi's consultation limitations).
189. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-8-302 (1999).
190. Id.
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mittee must conduct a public hearing to receive public comments and
testimony. 9 ' Fifteen days prior to the proposed implementation
date, the committee is required to make public a summary of the re-
sults of the hearing and the committee's recommendations. 9 2
Certainly, providing sufficient notice, a timely public hearing, or
other public input in a manner that allows a meaningful opportunity
to be heard will help ensure prudent decisionmaking that takes into
account a wide range of needs and issues. To some degree, though,
the question of how to receive information-by public comment,
hearing, or otherwise-will depend on both the nature of the service
being considered for privatization and practice within the geographi-
cal area.
1. Information.-Some states limit the information to be consid-
ered to that which favors privatization. Utah's privatization board, for
example, is charged with the responsibility of maintaining communi-
cation with, and access to, information from entities promoting privat-
ization,19 but it is not similarly charged to seek out information from
those opposed to or neutral on privatization. 94 The better practice is
to require consideration of a wider range of evidence, including that
which does not support privatization. Montana, for example, requires
that a privatization plan include "a narrative explanation and justifica-
tion for the proposed privatization, '"195 as well as
(e) an estimate of the cost savings or any additional costs
resulting from privatizing the program, compared to the
costs of the existing, nonprivatized program. Additional
costs must include the estimated cost to the state of inspec-
tion, supervision, and monitoring of the proposed privat-
ization and the costs incurred in the discontinuation of such
a contract;
(f) the estimated current and future economic impacts of
the implementation of the plan on other state programs, in-
cluding public assistance programs, unemployment insur-
ance programs, retirement programs, and agency personal




193. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-55a-3(1)(e) (1997).
194. Similarly, Virginia's Commonwealth Competition Council is charged with promot-
ing privatization, but the legislature failed to require the Council to consider whether the
state should be privatizing. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9-342 (Michie 1998).
195. MoN'r. CODE ANN. § 2-8-303(1)(i).
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(g) the estimated increases or decreases in costs and quality
of goods or services to the public if the plan is implemented;
[and]
(h) the estimated changes in individual wages and benefits
resulting from the proposed privaization ... 196
Colorado specifically requires considering "[t]he consequences and
potential mitigation of improper or failed performance by the con-
tractor." 97 It further demands the consideration of whether privatiz-
ing a particular service would amount to an improper delegation of a
state function.1
98
These sorts of information, as well as anything relevant that is
provided by any interested parties, should certainly be considered
before a state decides to privatize a government function. In short,
states need to recognize that, with so much at stake, they need a wide
range of information. It is difficult to understand why any state would
have legislation that does not require this. Those that fail in this re-
gard are failing the trust placed in them by those they represent.
2. The Decisionmaker's Qualifications.-If a state or other govern-
mental entity is considering a program of contracting out government
services, it is essential that it establish an expert body to assess bids, to
ensure that all procedural and substantive requirements are met, and
to create a uniform process. The officers of that entity must have suf-
ficient skills and access to information to be able to assess complex
financial and technical specifications and bids. Finally, the deci-
sionmaker must be both impartial and perceived as impartial.
Alaska's chief procurement officer, for example, is part of the partially
exempt service and must have "at least five years of prior experience
in public procurement, including large scale procurement of supplies,
services, or professional services, and must be a person with demon-
strated executive and organizational ability."' 9 9 While the require-
ment of relevant experience is obvious, states may want to consider
whether such officials might need the due process rights. provided by
civil service coverage.
196. Id. § 2-8-303(1)(e)-(h).
197. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-50-503(1)(f) (I) (West Supp. 2000).
198. Id. § 24-50-503(1)(f) (II); cf Shenk, supra note 29, at 19 ("Asked by Senator David
Pryor (D-Arkansas) if other government contractors were performing 'inherently govern-
mental functions'--deciding where and how to spend taxpayer money and exercising judg-
ment on matters of due process-a GAO report responded with a resounding yes. In just a
few agencies it found dozens of examples.").
199. ALAsKA STAT. § 36.30.010(a) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1995). By being partially ex-
empt, the chief procurement officer can be fired only for cause; other parts of the civil
service rules do not apply. Id.
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Again, the legislature should consider the points at which such an
office would become involved in the process. If the functions are di-
vided among different entities, this would affect the relevant basic
qualifications for each of the entities. States with existing programs
vest this function of deciding whether and what to contract out in a
number of different offices. 200 To some extent, these reflect political
or practical views and the variety of duties vested in the body. The
wider the range of responsibilities vested in the agency, the harder it
will be to find people competent to perform them all. On the other
hand, if duties are divided among different agencies, some means of
ensuring coordination must be established. Given the wide range of
services provided by government, collaborative work is the only means
of ensuring that relevant expertise is brought to bear on each deci-
sion. The exact qualifications are highly dependent upon the struc-
ture of the contracting process, the size of state government and the
state's population, and the degree to which services are publicly pro-
vided. Certainly, deep experience with public administration is
indispensable.
3. The Membership of the Decisionmaker.-One way to ensure ac-
cess to the best information possible is to include a wide range of in-
terests among members of the body that makes the decision. The
interests represented should include those for and against privatiza-
tion, and those of public employee unions, public employers, agency
clients, the community at large, and the business community.
Almost as important as which interests are included is the ap-
pointment process. Utah's Privatization Policy Board, for example, is
composed of thirteen members who serve staggered four-year
terms.20 ' The governor is directed to appoint two senators and two
representatives, one from each political party; two members to rep-
resent public employees, whose names are to be recommended by the
largest public employees' association; one member from state man-
agement; five members from the private business community; and one
member representing education. 20 2
In contrast, Arizona's legislative mandate to privatize the adminis-
tration of its welfare program is carried out by its works agency pro-
200. See, e.g., id. (vesting in the commissioner of administration and the chief procure-
ment officer the power over procurement of supplies, services, and professional services).
201. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-55a-2(1)(a), 2(2)(a) (1997).
202. Id. § 63-55a-2(1)(b).
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curement board.20 3 The board's membership makes unlikely the
existence of anything other than a bias toward privatization. The stat-
ute states that the board is "established to receive proposals and award
a contract by January 1, 1999 with a private entity for implementation
of the Arizona works program."2 4 The board, whose members are
appointed by the governor, is made up of nine members: (1) the di-
rector of the department of economic security; (2) two persons from
the private sector with procurement experience; (3) two representa-
tives of a major employer in the state; (4) two representatives from
community based organizations; and (5) two representatives from
small businesses in the state.20 5 Missing from the board are important
interested parties, such as representatives of employees, unions, and
welfare recipients.
Alaska's eleven-member commission not only has a far more rep-
resentative composition than does Arizona's, but its members are also
likely to represent the interests they are appointed to serve. Rather
than being appointed by the governor, some members are selected by
interest groups. The commission includes:
(1) one member of the senate appointed by the president of
the senate who shall serve as co-chair;
(2) one member of the house appointed by the speaker of
the house who shall serve as co-chair;
(3) one member appointed by the Alaska Municipal League;
(4) two public members appointed by the president of the
senate, one of whom shall be a representative of a Native
corporation... ;
(5) two public members appointed by the speaker of the
house, one of whom shall be a representative of a Native
corporation... ;
(6) one member appointed by the Alaska State Chamber of
Commerce;
(7) one member appointed by the American Federation of
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations;
(8) one member from the minority caucus of the house ap-
pointed by the speaker of the house; [and]
203. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-343 (West Supp. 2000) (establishing the Arizona
works agency procurement board and charging it with the task of implementing Arizona's
welfare to work program).
204. Id. § 46-343(A).
205. Id. § 46-343(A) (1 )-(5). Similarly, Mississippi charges the body that reviews govern-
mental functions for possible privatization to consult with representatives from the private
sector, but no other constituencies-a highly skewed and limited directive. See Miss. CODE
ANN. § 27-103-209(2) (2000).
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(9) one member from the minority caucus of the senate ap-
pointed by the president of the senate.2 °6
The statute further expands the input the commission receives by pro-
viding for the appointment of an advisory council to assist the com-
mission in carrying out its duties.20 7
It might be argued that there is no point in including public em-
ployees on such a board because they will do no more than be ob-
structionist. However, Representative John L. Mica (R-Fla.), chairman
of the House Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee on
Civil Service, contends that "federal employees should have the
chance to challenge cost-saving claims." 2 8 Challenging claims in such
a context and forcing claimants to upgrade information is a vital way
to protect the public interest-as important as providing the informa-
tion initially.
Indeed, it needs to be recognized, admitted, and taken into con-
sideration that the process of subcontracting is a very political one
with strong feelings on both ends of the spectrum and that public
employees, eager to save their jobs, are not the only ones whose posi-
tion might have some elements of predictability. This means that
while it is important to have the involvement of partisans who will
actively advance their views, if the process is to be free from charges of
corruption, incompetence, or favoritism, it is vital that the office and
officer charged with making the decision be isolated from political
pressures and not be seen as partial. 2" Alaska attempts to achieve this
206. 1999 Alaska Sess. Laws 61, § 2
207. Id. § 2(b). Kansas has established a performance review board of five members, at
least one of whom must have cost accounting experience. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7102(a)
(1997). No more than three members may be from the same political party. Id. The
members of the board are appointed by the governor, subject to senate confirmation, for
four-year terms. Id.
208. Hanna, supra note 41, at D-20.
209. The importance of preventing the perception of partiality and of protecting the
decisionmaker from political pressure was demonstrated in Massachusetts, after the state
legislature passed a subcontracting law in 1993 designed to save taxpayers money, ensure
continuity of service, and prevent graft and corruption. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7,
§§ 52-55 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000). Under the "Pacheco law," the state can only contract
out government services if it is given written evidence that subcontracting will save money
and improve the quality of service. Id. § 54(7). See generally Bruce A. Wallin, The Need for a
Privatization Process: Lessons from Development and Implementation, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 11, 16,
18 (1997) (discussing the development of the Pacheco law and examining its underlying
principles).
In 1997, Massachusetts State Auditor Joe DeNucci, the individual charged with ad-
ministering the law, refused to approve a plan to privatize transit routes because there was
no evidence that privatizing them would save any money or improve service. Robert A.
Jordan, DeNucci Resists False Lure of Transportation Privatization, BOSTON GLOBE, May 18,
1997, at C4. DeNucci explained that the private bidders had "'significant performance
306 [VOL. 60:249
2001] LEGISLATING ON PRIVATIZATION AND SUBCONTRACTING 307
goal, in part, by providing that its chief procurement officer is ap-
pointed to a term of six years and may be removed by the commis-
sioner of administration only for cause.21°
Although it is rarely addressed in subcontracting legislation,
avoiding conflicts of interest and the appearance of partiality by the
actual decisionmaker must be made a priority.211 Given the very na-
ture of the undertaking, there are enormous opportunities for corrup-
tion, insider dealing, and the like-all of which give decisionmakers
the opportunity to corrupt the process and compromise the public
welfare for their own, or someone else's, benefit.
Utah, for example, has taken the initiative to avoid these
problems by forbidding certain interactions when a quasi-governmen-
tal entity is privatized.2 12 These include forbidding certain individu-
als-such as officials of the quasi-governmental entity, lobbyists, and
entities in which those individuals hold business interests-from re-
ceiving specified benefits under privatization contracts. 2 13 The forbid-
den benefits include receiving compensation from a quasi-
governmental entity, if payment is conditioned in whole or in part on
legislative or executive action related to privatization; receiving assets
of the quasi-governmental entity or its successor; and receiving certain
forms of compensation related to privatization.2 14 Violations can re-
sult in felony, misdemeanor, and civil penalties.
215
In short, the membership of such a decisionmaking body must be
both inclusive and exclusive. It must include the input of all inter-
ested constituencies, but also exclude improper influence.
problems' in other cities," that the plan called for giving them heavy subsidies, and that the
bid failed to include important information concerning how the work would be per-
formed. Id. Despite the apparent problems with the proposal, DeNucci's decision was
attacked by those who alleged that he was "anti-privatization." Id. But see A. Joseph
DeNucci, Privatization Should Deliver Ample Benefits, TELEGRAM & GAZErrE (Worcester,
Mass.), Mar. 22, 1996, at Al3 (commenting on his role as a state auditor and his willingness
to approve privatization plans when they were capable of improving quality and lowering
costs).
210. ALASKA STAT. § 36.30.010(a) (Michie Supp. 1995).
211. See ScLAR, supra note 1, at 105-06 (stating that privatization must be strictly super-
vised to recognize and prevent incidents of corruption and graft); id. at 164-66 (discussing
the need to separate politics from subcontracting decisionmaking).
212. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-95-401 (Supp. 2000).
213. Id. § 63-95-401(1).
214. Id. § 63-95-401(2).
215. Id. § 63-95-403.
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L Negotiating the Contract
Once a decision is made to award a contract, someone must un-
dertake the negotiations. Many of the issues involved at other steps
also apply here, including the need for expertise, avoiding partiality,
specifying standards, and oversight. It is also important at this stage to
negotiate the details of terminating the contract. Virtually all ele-
ments discussed above concerning substantive criteria come into play
in negotiating the contract.
The one fact that should be emphasized is that contract negotia-
tion involves highly specialized skills. This is particularly the case in
subcontracting. The negotiators must be pessimists in the sense of
trying to predict and provide for all potential errors, defaults, and mis-
feasances. The need for these special skills should lead legislatures to
consider who can best perform the critical role of negotiator. Al-
though the public agency would have expertise in the nature of its
work, it would not necessarily have expertise in negotiating and pre-
paring contracts. In addition, the agency is likely to be seen as biased.
Thus, while the public agency certainly should be available for consul-
tation on technical matters, care should be taken in determining just
what role it will play in the negotiation process. This, again, is a job
that may be carried out better by a centralized body, but not necessar-
ily one comprised of the same people who made the decision to sub-
contract. Assessing information and making the ultimate decision to
contract out require different skills than those required for
negotiation.
Furthermore, by the time the negotiation stage has been
reached-especially if layoffs are contemplated-the affected employ-
ees' union must become part of the process. Failure to do so consti-
tutes a breach of the duty to bargain and may result in public liability
for back pay, benefits, and reinstatement of the workers.2" 6
216. See, e.g., Elsa Brenner, Westchester Briefs: Privatization Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
1997, at 14WC-8 (reporting on a state administrative law judge's ruling against a county
medical center that unilaterally subcontracted some services without negotiating a settle-
ment with a nurses' union); see also In re N.Y. State Nurses Ass'n, 31 Off. Dec. of N.Y. Pub.
Employ. Rel. Bd. 3034 (1998) (upholding a state administrative law judge's decision to
restore a contracted-out unit of a county medical center, to reinstate a county employee to
her original employment, and to award to that employee damages for lost wages, benefits,
and conditions of employment).
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j Exercising Oversight
A recent GAO study found oversight to be the weakest element of
privatization. 217 One committed to the marketplace as a fully self-reg-
ulatory mechanism might argue that there need be no oversight of
subcontracted work. However, the market conditions of competition,
with many small buyers and sellers and complete information, are un-
likely to exist for most types of governmental functions. Therefore,
some method of ensuring compliance with contract terms is neces-
sary. Some entity must be charged with ensuring that subcontracted
work meets the agreed-upon criteria during the term of the contract
and with assessing whether the express performance benchmarks are
adequate or need improvement. 21t  Oversight must take place on a
regular and frequent basis to ensure actual performance and quality.
Oversight is also essential to provide early warning of problems in or-
der to prevent a subcontractor from absconding or engaging in finan-
cial improprieties. If oversight is not frequent and regular, problems
that could have been prevented may become serious and even
irreparable.
Oversight requires regular reporting to the legislature, to the ex-
ecutive, and to the public. Reporting should be on at least an annual
basis-or more frequently, if necessary.219 More frequent reporting is
217. See Social Services Privatization, supra note 1, at 40 (prepared statement of Mark V.
Nadel, Associate Director, U.S. General Accounting Office) (citing LESSONS LEARNED, supra
note 26, discussing GAO studies that concluded that the monitoring of a subcontractor's
performance is the weakest link in the privatization process, and underscoring difficulties
encountered in setting clear goals for performance measurement). The need for oversight
is demonstrated in a report by the California State Auditor examining the state contracting
process. Although not dealing with the contracting out of government services, it details
many serious problems, including avoiding competitive bidding, and thus increasing costs;
failing to specify benchmarks so oversight could be exercised; and omitting any method for
planning, monitoring, and evaluating performance. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, STATE CON-
TRACTING: REFORMS ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Aug. 1996). All of
these could easily arise in contracting out government services.
218. See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 26, at 16 (reporting that, according to the govern-
ment officials surveyed, "monitoring and oversight that not only evaluates compliance with
the terms of the privatization agreement but also evaluates a private firm's performance in
delivering services is needed when a government's direct role in the delivery of services is
reduced through privatization"); id. at 18 (reporting that all of the officials surveyed be-
lieved that "independent oversight of privatization efforts was critical").
219. Arizona's welfare privatization program requires bimonthly reporting with a com-
prehensive report at the end of the first year to determine: (1) whether the private contrac-
tor has met the contract's requirements, the goals of the program, and the requirements of
its performance bond; (2) "[t]he fiscal impact of Arizona works implementation"; and (3)
the impact of Arizona works implementation on placement of recipients in paid employ-
ment, reduction of caseloads, and development of community partnerships. ARz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 46-344(A), (B) (West Supp. 1999). A more comprehensive report is required
in the fourth year of the program. See id. § 46-345(A). In addition to the sorts of informa-
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advisable where sensitive matters are handled, large sums of money
are involved, or interruption or degradation of service would be espe-
cially serious.
The skills needed by an oversight body include proficiency in
contract auditing and performance monitoring. Contract auditing
ensures that payment is made only as provided in the contract, while
performance monitoring ensures that services meet quality
standards. 2
20
The oversight body itself can take many forms, depending on the
situation. It can, for example, be lodged within the department
whose work was subcontracted, if that is appropriate and can best as-
sure proper performance. 22 ' That department has the advantage of
expertise-and thus can more accurately assess whether the contract
terms are being carried out-and can also make recommendations
for improvement. Another oversight candidate would be the same
body that decides whether to subcontract. Both candidates fully un-
derstand the context in which the subcontracting is taking place. Cer-
tainly, in all but the simplest contracting out situations, the assessment
criteria are many and complicated and often cannot be understood
outside their context.
However, there are important reasons why neither should be the
overseer-and certainly not the sole overseer.222 Most fundamentally,
tion required in the annual report, the fourth-year report must include a survey of client
satisfaction. Id. § 46-345(A) (5).
220. See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 26, at 17 (discussing the two methods used to
monitor privatization).
221. Arkansas, for example, requires that when state functions of the Division of Youth
Services are privatized, the contract must "include a performance evaluation provision that
outlines a method for evaluating the service provided under the contract." ARK. CODE
ANN. § 25-10-137(a) (Michie 1999). The legislature further demands that the Division
"identify the goals and performance indicators of the contract and how the state agency
intends to evaluate the service provided." Id. In addition, the Department of Human Ser-
vices must make an annual report to the legislature concerning the subcontractor's per-
formance. Id § 25-10-137(b).
222. See LESSONs LEARNED, supra note 26, at 18 (finding that "[i]ndependent oversight
by an office that is outside the control of the unit responsible for operating the activity
provides more objective and unbiased evaluation of privatized activities than is possible by
senior government managers or program-level monitors").
Joshua Wolf Shenk reported that the Department of Energy (DOE)-which "relies
more heavily on the private sector than any other agency," with eighty to ninety percent of
its budget paid to private companies-has a "miserable record." Shenk, supra note 29, at
17. At Rocky Flats plutonium plant, Rockwell International, a private contractor for the
DOE, "poured toxic and radioactive waste into the ground, and stored more in leaky metal
drums," leaving "108 separate waste dumps and toxic solvents in the earth at 1,000 times
the acceptable concentration." Id. Officials of the DOE "gave Rockwell $27 million to
clean up five 'ponds' of radioactive and hazardous waste that it had helped create." Id. at
17-18. But Rockwell "bungled" the procedure, and the GAO estimated that cleaning the
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only an overseer that has no other goal than determining whether the
contract terms have been met can make a fair assessment and also be
perceived as capable of making a fair assessment. Agency capture,
cronyism, and even conflicts of interest between an agency, the entity
that decided to subcontract, and a subcontractor must play no part in
the oversight process.
Elliott Sclar describes the many ways in which Massachusetts's de-
cision to subcontract road maintenance suffered from oversight by an
interested party.223 The governor's administration that had advocated
privatization wanted to prove the program was a success.224 As a re-
sult, costs were deferred to later years or were shifted to inappropriate
accounts; public sector workers were pressed into service to perform
the subcontractor's work; public assets were lent to the subcontractor;
supervision costs were understated; important parts of maintenance
went undone as a result of the haste with which the privatization oc-
curred; the performance of many tasks did not meet the requirements
of the contract; and no benchmarks or baselines were created.225
Worst of all, the oversight body set up by the executive branch was not
motivated to find any fault with the subcontractor's performance-
rather, to find only success. 226
An oversight body should have distance from individual contrac-
tors so it is not tempted to slant its findings-something that is easy to
do and difficult to detect when complex criteria are involved. It is
important that the oversight agency and the body deciding whether to
subcontract not be ideologically motivated, nor be the captive of ideo-
logues with rigid positions on privatization, nor have other motives
unrelated to the public's interest.
ponds would take until 2009, and would cost over $170 million. Id. at 18. However, the
DOE gave the contractor a rating of 90 out of 100 and paid $26.8 million in bonuses. Id.
"The department's management is so thin and the burden of oversight so heavy that there
is virtually no accountability." I. Shenk concluded:
[W]hen the government contracts out, the lack of qualified managers-or sheer
incompetence-often leads to a surrender of authority to the shadow govern-
ment. With time, as contractors make the crucial decisions and develop expertise
and authority, the government starts working for the contractor instead of the
other way around. Decisions that should be the province of elected officials fall
into the hands of hired guns.
id-
223. ScLAR, supra note 1, at 28-46.
224. See id, at 33.
225. See id. at 33-42 (discussing the various findings of two independent examinations by
a legislative audit bureau and the state auditor that challenged the administration's asser-
tion that the privatization program was a success).
226. See id. at 34 (discussing oversight problems in the context of the Massachusetts road
maintenance privatization contract).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Hiring contractors to monitor one another's performance is also
an inappropriate method of oversight. While it may appear that their
natural competitiveness and expertise would make them especially
good critics of each other's performance, they may, in fact, extend
"professional courtesy" to one another, hoping a "kind" eye will later
examine their own operations. ACES President Geraldine Jensen
testified:
Another expensive and worrisome practice is when states
hire one vendor to monitor another vendor's performance.
For example: Massachusetts paid Lockheed Martin IMS
$13.2 million for a computer system and paid Maximus $1.9
million to monitor the Lockheed Martin IMS contract.
Oklahoma paid PSI $1 million for work on the computer
and then paid Maximus $102,000 to monitor PSI's contract.
We are concerned that having one vendor monitoring con-
tracts of another, gives both vendors an incentive not to com-
plete the contract on budget and on time. Cost overruns
and not meeting deadlines has been a repetitive problem
found with vendors on state automated child support en-
forcement systems.227
The oversight process must give the public easy access to lodge
complaints, to ask questions, and to get responses. If the public can-
not find someone to whom problems can be reported, then no one
can be held accountable, 22 ' and subcontracting may fail to provide a
superior service or even the same level of service.
In short, an oversight body must not be or appear to be taking
action for any reasons other than ones based on law and fact. Unfor-
tunately, privatization contracts can be so lucrative and so many peo-
ple have vested interests by the time subcontracting takes place-
including governmental entities-that the list of candidates can be
227. Social Services Privatization, supra note 1, at 145 (statement of Geraldine Jensen).
228. GeraldineJensen testified:
ACES members in all of the states utilizing private companies for child support
enforcement report problems identifying that a private company was responsible
for action on their case. They also experienced the inability to find the govern-
ment agency responsible to monitor the private company to voice a complaint of
problems with the contractor. Attached to my testimony is a list of states who
have contracts with PSI, Maximus and Lockheed Martin IMS. Families who re-
port little or no action or incorrect action on their cases by private vendors can-
not determine who to hold accountable. If the family is lucky enough to be able
to determine which government agency hired the vendor, the state agency often
tells them there is nothing they can do because the case has been turned over to a
private company.
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short. What is needed is officials who are knowledgeable, but who
also are bound by ethical rules and their own conduct to perform
these duties with the highest degree of probity, isolated from im-
proper influence.
K. Terminating Contracts
Contracts may terminate either when the contract's end date is
reached or when there is a breach.229 Some states mandate a term
limit. Massachusetts, for example, limits the term of privatization con-
tracts to five years. 30 There are both advantages and disadvantages to
such a scheme. On the one hand, it may be disruptive to have a peri-
odic reassessment of the initial decision to subcontract. On the other,
a fixed date means all parties know there is a chance of nonrenewal.
Most affected would be the subcontractor, who will be unable to feel
he has gained a sinecure and will be impelled to perform at a level
that will make it likely that the contract will be renewed.
A specific termination date requires the government to assess
whether the subcontractor met the goals set for privatization. By hav-
ing a specific date, the government can either be ready for a graceful
transition to another contractor or be prepared to recapture the work.
Some privatization experiments do fail, and when they fail, the
government-preferably through well thought-out contract
processes-must be prepared to step in. Privatization failures without
forethought can be disastrous. When EAI failed to meet its contrac-
tual undertakings, the city of Baltimore was suddenly faced with the
prospect of having to step in to ensure that public education could
still be provided.23'
Having specific safeguards may help prevent such a problem by
making it clear what the consequences are. Fallback arrangements
can include financial protections, such as requiring the contractor to
put up a bond or buy insurance, as well as contingency provisions to
resume public services if the contractor is dismissed or leaves. The
contract should determine the level of financial protections appropri-
ate to the situation. Ideally, it should provide for liquidated damages
to cut the likelihood of protracted litigation over damages.
229. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTs § 8.8, at 551-52 (3d ed. 1999).
230. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 54(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
231. Cf supra note 105 and accompanying text (noting the City of Baltimore's forced
decision to bail out its school system with public money to prevent the system from
collapsing).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
In short, although it is always difficult to think about failure or
endings at the start of a new enterprise, no privatization contract
should be let without such forethought and contingency planning.
L. Prosecuting Breaches and Other Misfeasance
Subcontracting legislation should include an enforcement mech-
anism. This could rely on an array of litigation or para-litigation de-
vices, including mediation. This is the one area in which most states
should already be well prepared and not need specialized provisions.
It is likely that failures to comply can be adequately dealt with through
existing criminal or civil penalties, or, if necessary, contract remedies
built into the subcontracting arrangement. States have experience
dealing with extortion, bribery, misfeasance, and breach of contract.
Nonetheless, each state may want to assess, at the time it sets up a
privatization process, whether existing remedies are sufficient, or
whether subcontracting-specific remedies are necessary.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are important questions that need to be asked and answers
that are never given when it comes to privatization. Must privatization
take place with none of the guidance that experience and common
sense can provide? Must people be victimized by scams, failures, and
cost overruns in the name of privatization? The answer is "no." We
can protect our assets and services, save taxpayers millions of dollars,
and prevent graft and corruption if our leaders only have the wisdom
and courage to learn from privatization mistakes and successes. This
is a case in which being wise requires hard work and the courage to
stand up for what is right in the face of those who preach a simple and
seductive message: the market will provide.
Our political leaders need to remember that what most taxpayers
want is good quality and stable public services at a reasonable cost-
not subcontracting to satisfy an ideology or to help a subcontractor
make a profit. As tempting as it is to avoid the complex decisions
necessary to decide whether a specific service is best provided by the
public or private sector, legislators know they have a responsibility not
to waste public money, and they certainly do not want to be accused of
causing waste by making ill-advised, poorly thought-through decisions.
If states continue to subcontract without taking precautions to
safeguard the public, waste and poor service are likely at best. At
worst, there may be disasters. It is not too late to learn from past mis-
takes and use common sense to make wiser decisions about how to
provide public services.
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